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FOREWORD 
Roughly 1.6 billion people, 4 0  percent of the world's popu- 
lation, live in urban areas today. .At the beginning of the last 
century, the urban population of the world totaled only 25  mil- 
lion. According to recent United Nations estimates, about 3.1 
billion people, twice today's urban population, will be living 
in urban areas by the year 2000.  
Scholars and policy makers often disagree when it comes to 
evaluating the desirability of current rapid rates of urban growth 
in many parts of the globe. Some see this trend as fostering 
national processes of socioeconomic development, particularly in 
the poorer and rapidly urbanizing countries of the Third World; 
whereas others believe the consequences to be largely undesirable 
and argue that such urban growth should be slowed down. 
As part of a search for convincing evidence for or against 
rapid rates of urban growth in developing countries, the Human 
Settlements and Services Area initiated in 1977  a research pro- 
ject to study the process of structural transformation in nations 
evolving from primarily rural-agrarian to urban-industrial soci- 
eties. Data from several countries selected as case studies are 
being collected, and the research is focusing on spatial popula- 
tion growth and economic development, and on their resource and 
service demands. 
This paper describes a prototype model of the urbanization 
and development process. It sets out a general equilibrium per- 
spective that illuminates several fundamental aspects of the pro- 
cess of demoeconomic structural change and synthesizes the grow- 
ing recent literature on general equilibrium modeling of dualis- 
tic development. When subjected to empirical analysis it should 
be capable of describing the past and of assessing alternative 
future consequences of rapid urbanization and growth. 
A list of papers in the Population, Resources, and Growth 
Series appears at the end of this publication. 
Andrei Rogers 
Chairman 
Human Settlements 
and Services Area 
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ABSTRACT 
The p a s t  q u a r t e r  c e n t u r y  has  wi tnessed  unprecedented 
economic p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e  Thi rd  World. Yet major problems 
have a r i s e n ,  someof which a r e  t h e  consequences o f  t h e  pro- 
g r e s s  i t s e l f  and may become s e r i o u s  c o n s t r a i n t s  on f u t u r e  
development. C i t y  growth i s  one such problem. P e s s i m i s t s  
s t r e s s  t h e  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s '  i n a b i l i t y t o c o p e w i t h  t h e  
r e s o u r c e  and s o c i a l  sys tems requi rements  of  r a p i d  urban 
growth, t h u s  prompting t h e  term "over -urbaniza t ion" .  Opt i -  
m i s t s  minimize t h e  n e g a t i v e  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and view urban 
growth a s  t h e  key t o r a i s i n g  ave rage  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and 
l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s .  A l l  of  t h i s  expe r i ence  has  t aken  p l a c e  
under c o n d i t i o n s  o f  "popu la t ion  exp los ions" .  
This  paper  p r e s e n t s  a g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  economic- 
demographic model which h i g h l i g h t s  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  of  urban- 
i z a t i o n .  A t t e n t i o n  i s  focused on t h e  de t e rminan t s  and 
consequences o f  ru ra l -u rban  m i g r a t i o n ,  on t h e  r e s o u r c e  de- 
mands o f  housing a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  r a p i d  u r b a n i z a t i o n ,  on 
op t ima l  l a n d  u s e  between urban and r u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
on t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  inves tments  t o  educa t ion  and l a b o r  
f o r c e  t r a i n i n g .  
The economic m o d e l i s d e s i g n e d  t o  be  " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "  
of  a  l a r g e  group o f  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s ,  and it w i l l  even- 
t u a l l y  c o n t a i n  a f u l l y  e l a b o r a t e d  demographic component. 
The model w i l l  b e t e s t e d w i t h  Th i rd  World growth e x p e r i e n c e  
s i n c e  t h e  1950s. I t  w i l l  t h e n  be u s e d t o a n a l y z e  t h e  s o u r c e s  
of  m i g r a t i o n  and u r b a n i z a t i o n ,  and t o  e x p l o r e  t h e i r  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  w i t h  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  accumula t ion  and growth. 
- v i i  - 
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MODELING URBANIZATION 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Allen C. Kelley and 
Jeffrey G. Williamson 
1. THE PROBLEM 
1.1 Introduction 
The past quarter century has witnessed unprecedented economic 
progress in the Third World as gauged by the standards of history 
since the Industrial Revolution. Yet major probl.ems.have arisen, 
some of which are the consequence of the progress itself and may 
become serious constraints on future development. City growth is 
one such problem. By the end of this century the United Nations 
forecasts (1 976: 22-44, 77-83) : 
1. Urban population growth rates three,times those 
of rural areas; 
2. Two billion people, exceeding 40 percent of the 
Third World population, living in cities; 
3. Some cities reaching extremely large sizes: 
Mexico City (31.6 million); S ~ O  Paulo (26.0 
million); and Cairo, Jakarta, Seoul, and 
Karachi each exceeding 15 million. 
Analysts and policy makers are sharply divided on the 
validity and consequences of these forecasts. Pessimists stress 
the developing countries' inability to cope with the resource and 
social systems requirements of rapid urban growth and high urban 
densities, thus prompting the term "over-urbanization". Optimists 
view urban growth as the key device for raising average living 
standards and labor productivity. The optimists also view 
urbanization as a natural outcome of economic development, and a 
necessary requirement for the more rational use of economic 
resources. Debate over public policy options regarding Third 
World urban growth remains intense. 
A second and related problem often cited as constraining 
economic progress is the "population explosion". From 1950 to 
1979 Third World populations (excluding China) increased from 
1.8 billion to 3.3 billion; by the end of this century the tally 
is estimated to read 5.1 billion. This exceptional pace of 
population growth has resulted in enormous resource demands, 
especially given the low labor productivities and high dependency 
rates found in these countries. Economists and demographers 
cannot agree on the quantitative effects of these trends on 
economic development, although the general assessment ranges from 
extreme pessimism to mild concern. (Compare, for example, Coale 
and Hoover 1958 and Enke 1971 with Kuznets 1960, 1967 and 
Adelman and Robinson 1978.) 
To assess the nature and significance of urban growth and 
demographic change on economic development, it is necessary to 
specify a theoretical framework which, when subjected to empirical 
analysis, is capable of describing the past, assessing the future, 
and displaying relevant policy options. The present paper 
presents the elements of one such economic model. Four criteria 
have guided our selection of specifications. 
First, we have insisted that the framework be analytically 
interpretable. This requirement necessitates the suppression of 
regional, sectoral, and household detail which might add 
"realism", but which would relegate analysis to the "black box" 
of numerous computer simulations. Although our model is still 
large, its specifications are designed to be sufficiently 
transparent to permit some qualitative analysis of the key 
results. * 
Second, we have specified the model so as to be empirically 
implementable. At every stage in model formulation, extensive 
use has been made of information assembled by the World Bank, 
United Nations, national governments, and of the results of 
numerous econometric studies of developing countries. 
Third, the model has been designed to analyze a low-income 
growing economy which falls within the small-country category. 
The latter refers less to size of land area, population or 
economic market, and more to the assumption that the country is 
a price taker in world markets. The country must not be so 
important in export markets that it can materially influence 
world prices. Given this assumption, countries with primary 
product exports which are important in their domestic economy, 
and which constitute a notable share of world consumption (e.g., 
oil, copper, tin), may not be explained well by our model. 
Finally, the model has been developed to offer additional 
insight into the standard questions in development economics: 
the sources of growth and structural change, the determinants 
of physical and human capital accumulation, the impact of growth 
on the distribution of income, the role of technological progress, 
and so forth. The model has also been developed to offer insight 
into questions which are less conventional: the role of energy 
imports, the determinants of land use, the explanation for the 
rise in urban land prices, the impact of housing market behavior, 
the role of spatially nontradable services on migration, and 
others. Moreover, the framework has been specified with an eye 
toward performing policy "counterfactuals" and, as a result, 
government policy parameters are numerous in the model. 
*The model is small compared to recent efforts in general equilib- 
rium modeling. The most ambitious effort in this area is by 
Irma Adelman and Sherman Robinson. Their Korean model contains 
over 3000 endogenous variables; the requirements for parameteriza- 
tion were extensive (Adelman and Robinson, 1978). 
1.2 An Overview of the Model 
The model possesses a high degree of closure in its general 
equilibrium properties. Most input and output prices are 
determined endogenously, and thus interactions of supply and 
demand are critical to resource allocation. Neoclassical produc- 
tion functions are assumed, and price-responsive demand relation- 
ships within an integrated household demand system are highlighted. 
A period-by-period equilibrium is sought where factors move 
between and within sectors minimizing rate of return and earnings 
differentials, subject to various constraints. Optimization at 
the micro-economic level is imposed on firms and households who, 
within a Walrasian tstonnement process, independently maximize 
their returns and utilities, thereby implying an efficient 
allocation of economic resources. 
It should be already apparent that the model descends from 
a robust family tree: small scale general equilibrium models of 
dualistic development, large scale computable general equilibrium 
models, multisectoral models stressing interindustry linkages in 
the Leontief tradition, and even macro-economic-demographic 
models of limited closure which highlight population and govern- 
ment policy options.* Given this large and expanding literature, 
it might prove useful to stress the novelties in our own approach. 
*Early dualistic models include those of W.A. Lewis (1954), 
J.C. Fei and G. Ranis (1961, 1964), D.W. Jorgenson (1961, 1967), 
and P. Zarembka (1972). A review and extension of these and 
other :~dels can be found in A.C. Kelley, J.G. Williamson, and R. 
J. Cheetham (1972:7-17, 53,-57), and C. Lluch (1974). The 
earliest general equilibrium multisectoral framework revealing 
interindustry linkages is by L. Johansen (1959). Recent appli- 
cations include I. Adelman and S. Robinson (1978) and L. Bergman 
(1978). Macro-economic-demographic models of limited closure 
originated with the work of A. Coale and E. Hoover (1958). Later 
contributions include R. Rarlow (1967), R. Barlow and G. Davis 
(1974), F. Denton and B. Spencer (1976), S. Enke (1971); 
Bachue-Phillipines by G. Rodgers, M. Hopkins, and R. Wkry (1978), 
and J. Simon (1976) . 
We distinguish between tradeable8 and nontradeables, the 
latter including various location-specific services. This is 
hardly the first multisectoral model to recognize nontradeables 
but it is the first spatial dualistic model which simultaneously 
stresses the importance of nontradeables as an influence on 
migration behavior. The presence of nontradeables results in 
urban-rural cost-of-living differentials. Since migrants are 
assumed to move in response to improvements in expected earnings 
adjusted for cost of living differentials, the latter may exert 
an important impact on the rate of urban growth. For example, 
rapid urban growth will increase the relative scarcity of hous- 
ing (and support services) - both due to the short run rise in 
structure rents as well as the long run rise in land rents. As 
a result, the city will be somewhat less appealing to potential 
migrants. Furthermore, new house building (and social overhead) 
serves to diminish the rate of "productive" capital accumulation 
in the city and thus diminishes the rate of growth of job vacancies 
in the modern urban sector, reducing the attraction of the city 
still further. Urban growth, therefore, has embedded in it 
countervailing forces which may produce retardation over time, a 
characterization consistent with the stylized facts of history. 
Development economists have long emphasized the importance 
of human capital accumulation in the process of growth 
(Schultz 1961, 1972), but it has appeared infrequently in 
formal models; the emphasis almost always has been on 
conventional physical capital. A somewhat broader view of 
accumulation is taken in the present model. The modern urban 
sectors are specified to utilize skilled labor and these skills 
are assumed to be complementary with physical capital. Imperfect 
capital markets exclude individual investment in human capital, 
but firms invest in skills accumulation through training programs. 
This investment decision is made by comparing the discounted flow 
of augmented profits to the current training cost, namely the 
average return to investment in physical plant and equipment. The 
accumulation of human capital is thus determined by its return to 
the using firms as well as by the demographic trends influencing 
the stock of "potential trainables", and this stock is determined 
jointly by demography a n d  government policy towards formal 
education. In constrast to the Coale and H O G V ~ ~  (1958) tradition, 
demographically-induced expenditures on education are n o t  consid- 
ered unproductive consumption financed at the expense of produc- 
tive investment. OUY treatment may well alter the assessment of 
population growth on the pace of economic growth. 
While growth and development theory has made significant 
strides in introducing labor heterogeneity into its paradigms, 
a symmetric treatment of capital is less common. Of course 
capital has multisector uses, and frequently capital is treated 
as "putty-clay" so that once in place there are in effect many 
types of physical capital stocks. But this mainly represents a 
migration specification. Our model explicitly confronts ,*: port- 
folio of heterogeneous c a p i t a l  stocks consisting of "productive" 
conventional capital (plant and equipment), "unproductive" 
capital in residential structures (housing), and human capital 
(training and skills accumulation). All are financed out of a 
common saving pool and, subject t o  t h e  constraints of c a p i t a l  
market fragmentation, new investment is allocated according to its 
greatest return. Elements of portfolio choice are therefore 
confronted even in a simple model without financial assets. More- 
over, the economy's critical allocation of saving between "produc- 
tive" and "unproductive" uses obey traditional neoclassical rules, 
except that the institutional realities of the undeveloped Third 
World capital market constrain that allocation. These include: 
the absence of a mortage market so that all housing must be self 
financed; the absence of a household loan market so that individual 
investment in human capital is suppressed; demographic restrictions 
on the stock of'potential trainables" thus inhibiting firms' invest- 
ment in human capital and making it possible for the rate of 
return to human capital to remain at high levels; and the immobil- 
ity of physical capital once in place making it possible for rate 
of return differentials across sectors to persist over long 
periods of time. These "capital market imperfections" provide 
abundant options for government policy to eliminate inefficient 
resource allocations and "market failures" induced primarily by 
the disequilibriating impact of successful growth. Our model allows 
us to decompose the sources of those market failures as well as to 
evaluate the benefits from government intervention. 
Typically, development models incorporate very simple 
specifications for land use, constraining it to agricultural 
production and specifying its growth as exogenous. This treat- 
ment is appropriate for many purposes, but it is unacceptable in 
a model where a focus is urban growth and urban problems. In our 
model o p t i m a l  land  u s e  is explicitly confronted. Although we do 
not employ the urban economist's land gradient function, we are 
still able to formulate an explanation of the rate of urban 
encroachment on farmland at the city's margin. This urban land 
use 'specification has potentially important implications. Urban 
growth will bid up the price of urban land due largely to the 
requirements for residential structures and social overhead. 
Because land is immobile, it partakes of the same characteristics 
as nontradeables. Thus, endogenously determined land use and rents 
can notably influence sectoral cost-of-living differences with a 
resulting impact on rural-urban migration and city growth. In 
addition, the model is equipped to deal with two additional urban 
problems: first, the tension between rising urban population 
densities, on the one hand, and "suburbanization", on the other; 
and second, the dramatic rise in urban land values widely observed 
in the Third World. 
Government activities are typically specified as exogenous in 
formal models of development. However, given the accumulating 
evidence that government spending exhibits broadly systematic 
patterns which are related to growth and structural change, it 
seems appropriate to move toward a specification of endogenous 
government  f i s c a l  b e h a v i o r  (Heller, 1 9 7 5 ) .  In our model, government 
spending is constrained by the availability of public income 
stemming from endogenous tax revenues and exogenously determined 
international capital flows. The latter is specified in a manner 
which places us in the "revisionist" foreign aid camp since 
foreign capital does not augment the domestic savings pool dollar 
for dollar. Furthermore, the government allocates its capital 
budget to maximize returns while the current account is determined 
in response to social preferences. In addition, spending has an 
"urban bias". Government's domestic revenue sources are numerous, 
thus providing an opportunity. to assess alternative government 
taxation policies on structural change, the commodity price 
structure, growth and distribution. 
While the above specifications can he considered the most 
novel features of our economic model, it should also be emphasized 
that our framework attempts to synthesize a growing literature on 
general equilibrium systems.* Many of our model specifications 
can be found elsewhere. To our knowledge, however, these 
specificationshave yet to be combined in a single model capable 
of confronting many of the key macro development issues of the 
1980s. For example, n e s t e d  cons tan t  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
product ion f unc t ions  have been employed by Bergman (1978) and 
Edmonston, Sanderson,and Sapoznikow (1976), but the former 
incorporates only a limited role for demand, while the latter is 
not designed to confront urbanization or policy issues. Labor 
market  f ragmentat ion and uage gaps have been highlighted by Yap 
(1972, 1976a), but endogenous demand forces are suppressed in her 
model. Similar observations may be made for the treatment of 
imported energy r equ i remen t s ,  the use of the extended Zinear 
expend i tu re  s y s t em ,  and the specification of a migran t s '  
r e m i t t a n c e s  f unc t ion .  The time is ripe to exploit the theoretical 
advances in general equilibrium modeling. 
All of these remarks are directed towards the economic model 
discussed in Section 2. We have said nothing about the demo- 
graphy with which the economic model interacts. The demographic 
"studies using this approach include: I. Adelman and S. ~obinson 
(1978), F. Ahmed (1974), L. DeBever (19761, J.G. Williamson and 
L. DeBever (1977), J. Edmonston, W.C. Sanderson and J. ~apoznikow 
(1976), A.C. Kelley and J.G. Williamson (1974), A.C. Kelley, 
J.G. Williamson, and R.J. Cheetham (1972), K. Mera (1975), 
R. Nohan (1977), J.G. Williamson (1974), M. Yamaguchi (19731, 
L. Yap (1972, 1967a), J. de Melo (1978), J. de ~ e l o  and 
S. Robinson (1978), and F. Lysy and L. ~aylor 
model, yet to be specified,* will be detailed, involving urban 
and rural age-sex specific schedules of mortality, fertility, 
and migration. The demographic model determines urban and rural 
labor force supplies; the economic framework determines labor 
force needs as well as the equilibrating mechanism for matching 
needs with supplies from period to period. Demography enters 
directly by its influence on the level of demand and its 
composition (especially through housing requirements), by 
determining labor force growth (fixed age-sex-location labor 
force participation rates are assumed), by its impact on regional 
settlement patterns and land use, and by modifying the distribu- 
tion and availability of new investment or capital formation 
through the urban-rural remittance mechanism. Population growth 
rates are determined exogenously given the constancy of the var- 
ious demographic schedules, although aggregate population growth 
can change due to intersectoral migration. 
A final distinguishing feature of our model relates to the 
forces motivating its development and choice of specifications. 
Our model is not designed to explain the behavior of a specific 
low-income country. A case study approach is more appropriate to 
this task. Rather, our goal has been to capture the key features 
of a group of Third World, growing countries which are price-takers 
in international markets (around 50 countries fulfill this 
specification). Ours is a model of a "representative" Third 
World country. In developing our theoretical specifications, we 
have benefitted notably from the results of extensive empirical 
analysis undertaken on a sample of 22 such countries. For this 
purpose data from the World Bank, the United Nations, the 
International Labour Office, country studies, and the general 
economics literature have all been systematically exploited. It 
is our view that theorizing is nost likcly to succeed where there 
*The demographic model is being developed by R.M. Schmidt, 
and will be presented in "The Demographic Dimensions of Economic- 
Population ~odeling",forthcoming. The broad elements of 
Mr. Schmidt's model are outlined above. 
is sensitivity to empirical reality. Moreover, a model of 
theoretical elegance that cannot be empirically implemented is of 
little use. In many instances our theoretical specifications 
have been conditioned by this constraint. While the present 
paper focuses on modeling urbanization, demographic change and 
economic growth, it is to be emphasized that the model has drawn 
upon an extensive data base. 
1.3 Issues and Analysis: The Counterfactual 
While the model we have developed is parsimonious in its 
specification, it is still sufficiently large to require numerical 
techniques to analyze the results. For this purpose we will 
estimate the parameters and initial conditions using data for our 
"representative" countries, and employing the methodology now 
common to this type of general-equilibrium modeling (see Kelley, 
V7illiamson, and Cheetham 1972, chp.4). With estimation complete, 
the model will then be simulated over a quarter century. Does 
the model replicate historical Third World experience since the 
1950s? The answer will be supplied by the comparison of the 
model's dynamic forecasts with time series of relevant endogenous 
variables documented in World Tables. 
The second stage of analysis will involve an examination of 
comparative static results. Considerable insight into the 
workings of the model can be obtained by using the relatively 
simple tools of short run comparative statics, where the labor 
force, the stock of skills, technology, and capital assets are 
all exogenous. Moreover, comparative static analysis is especially 
well suited to sensitivity analysis: critical parameters for 
which empirical information is more tenuous can be identified with 
greater clarity. In addition, since the profession is far less 
confident about economic dynamics, it might be especially fruitful 
to explore that portion of the model about which we are more certain 
before pressing on to the comparative dynamics. 
After completing the comparative static analysis, we shall 
then turn to the more speculative comparative dynamics. Our 
first goal will be to confront conventional "growth" issues by 
exploring the impact of the rate and bias of technical progress, 
the saving parameters, and public and private demand parameters. 
The historical counterfactual will also be employed at this stage, 
where one or more parameters representing historically relevant 
situations will be varied and the resulting consequences examined. 
We also expect to dwell at length on policy counterfactuals. A 
sample of these counterfactuals follows. 
1 .  Government p o l i c y  toward " s q u a t t e r s  s e t t l e m e n t s  I f .  
Some countries have acted to limit the _size of 
urban squatters' settlements, even by the violent 
means of razing poor residential areas. The impact 
of such policies can be captured in our model in 
various ways. 
2. Government e d u c a t i o n  p o l i c y .  The demographic 
model will be equipped to handle changes in govern- 
ment educational policy through its impact either 
on the drop-out rate and/or on the rate of entry 
into the formal educational system. With a lag, 
such policy will have an impact on the stock of 
"urban trainables" and thus the rate of expansion in 
the stock of unskilled labor. It should also 
influence immigration rates and urbanization. 
3 .  Government and/or  u n i o n  p o l i c y  towards t h e  "wage 
gap f f  be tween modern and i n f o r m a l  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r s .  
The economic model postulates a nominal wage gap 
between modern sector unskilled labor employment 
and the informal urban service sector. Variations 
in this gap can be explored in the model and its 
impact on the distribution of income, migration, and 
urbanization evaluated. 
4 .  Energy s c a r c i t y  and O P E C .  Imported raw materials 
include fuel, and the price of these imports are 
exogenously determined in world markets. Counter- 
factual changes in the price of such imports can be 
investigated in the model, and in particular, 
its influence on the internal price structure, 
the rate of urbanization, growth and distribution. 
5. Urban property taxes. Very few Third World 
economies have urban property taxes, but debate 
over their use should increase especially in the 
face of rising land scarcity, notable capital 
gains in land, and the presence of "empty lots" 
in otherwise dense urban centers. The model 
allows us to examine the impact of such policies 
on urbanization, rents, and income distribution. 
6. ~ o p u l a t i o n  policy. The demographic model will 
treat mortality and fertility as exogenous 
variables (subject to variation over regions 
and thus subject to aggregate variations as 
urbanization proceeds). The present model is 
well equipped to trace through many of the likely 
economic impacts of government population policy. 
Indeed, this exercise will be especially helpful 
in identifying the impact of "population 
explosions" on Third World urbanization 
experience. 
7. Government policy towards financial institutions 
and its impact on migrants1 remittances. Urban 
migrant remittances (as a share of income) to 
rural housholds are given exogenously in our 
model. The remittance rate will be influenced by 
the availability of financial institutions to 
facilitate the transfer. The model is equipped 
to explore the impact of such changes on the 
structure of demand and other key endogenous 
variables in the system, especially migration 
and urbanization itself. 
8. Foreign aid and government attitude towards 
saving "self-sufficiency If. Many countries are 
taking a more jaundiced view of foreign assis- 
tarce and multinationals' investment. Since 
private and public foreign capital is given 
exogenously in the model, we can readily 
examine the impact of reductions in these 
"aid" levels. In particular, we shall be 
able to examine the extent to which domestic 
investment responds to changes in foreign 
aid. 
9 .  The r o l e  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  t a x  and i m p o r t  
t a r i f f .  The general equilibrium impact of 
export tax and import tariff policies can 
easily be evaluated in the model. Endoge- 
nous variables of interest include distri- 
bution and the rural outmigration rate 
From agriculture. 
This is only a sample of policy counterfactuals, but it should 
give a flavor of the scope of the model. 
Central to the analysis are the questions: What are the 
sources of urbanization? What can we expect urbanization 
experience in the remainder of the twentieth century to be like? 
What role have policy and denographic forces played in influenc- 
ing Third World urbanization experience? 
2. MODELING URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.1 Sectoral Activities: An Overview 
Our economy consists of eight sectors, each of which produces 
a single homogenous commodity or service. These sectors have a 
specific spatial location, urban or rural, and produce tradeables 
and nontradeables. As we shall see, the distinction between 
tradeables and nontradeables is central to cost-of-living differ- 
entials between regions and thus potentially important to the 
migration process and to urbanization. The tradeable and non- 
tradeable distinction is also relevant to the international 
exchange and specialization choices open to the economy. While 
the inclusion of nontradeable service activities has become 
familiar in the literature on computable general equilibrium 
models, we feel they are especially important in understanding 
the growth-inequality-urbanization process and have yet to receive 
the emphasis they deserve. 
There are two commodity producing sectors in the model: 
manufactures and primary products, both of which are tradeable 
internationally and interregionally. Their empirical counterparts 
are the following: The manufactures sector (M) includes both 
mining and manufacturing, since these sectors have broadly 
comparable technological characteristics. The primary product 
sector (A) includes agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Clearly, 
the M-sector is an urban activity while the A-sector is rural. 
No effort has been made here to distinguish between the subsistence 
and commercialized farm sectors, although we hope to do so in case 
study applications of the model. 
Service sector activities are highlighted in the model, especial- 
ly those that are not tradeable between locations. There are six 
service sector activities. The modern capital-cum-skill intensive 
service sector (RS) has as its empirical counterpart the combina- 
tion of electricity, gas, water, transportation, communications, 
defense, education, other government services, and construction of 
what we call urban high-cost housing stocks. While the output of 
the KS sector cannot be traded internationally, it can be traded 
interregionally within the economy. It is urban location-specific 
and is the central activity supplying the final demand needs 
generated by the government sector. Given demand conditions to 
be discussed below, the KS sector can be expected to be one of 
the "leading" growth sectors in our developing economy, a feature 
commonly ignored in development models. 
. - 
Recent qualitative models of migration (Todaro, 1969; Corden 
and Findlay, ,1975; Yap, 1972, 1976a,) have focused at length on 
the urban "traditional" service sector as a source of low-produc- 
tivity urban employment, and it has figured importantly in current 
conventional wisdom regarding the determinants of rural-urban 
migration and the rate of urbanization in the Third World. The 
literature has made no effort, however, to introduce similar 
activities for the rural sector, ignoring Hymer and ~esnick's (1969) 
useful emphasis on rural "Z goods" activities. We have chosen to 
follow Hymer and Resnick by introducing symmetry into the model: 
The rural labor-intensive service sector (RS) and the urban labor- 
intensive service sector (US) both produce services with empirical 
counterparts including domestics, personal services, and the con- 
struction of lower-quality housing stocks for relatively low-income 
wage earners. These two "traditional" labor-intensive service sec- 
tors do not produce outputs tradeable between regions and herein 
lies one potential source of cost-of-living differences between 
urban and rural areas. 
The model is completed by the addition of three remaining 
service sectors, all of which produce housing services from 
location-specific housing stocks. There is only one such housing 
activitiy in the rural sector (H,RS), since housing stocks there 
appear to be predominately low-cost, labor-intensive structures. 
The model will be developed to permit housing rents to be 
lower in rural areas, thereby providing the farm sector a cost- 
of-living advantage. Relatively cheap rural labor might yield 
that result by itself, but high site rents attached to scarce 
urban land should reinforce the rental differential. There are 
two housing activities in the urban sector: a higher-cost 
housing sector (HIKS) constructed by "modern" relatively capital- 
intensive methods and consumed by higher income groups; and a 
lower-cost housing sector (HIUS) constructed by "traditional" 
labor-intensive methods thus generating lower-quality housing for 
the urban poor at low rents. Accessibility of this low-cost hous- 
ing, the government's attitude towards squatter settlements, and 
thus the level of urban rents will figure importantly in migration 
decisions in our model. In reality, there is a continuum of housing 
units by quality. The dichotomy embedded in our model reflects an 
important aspect of that continuum--the differing nature of 
construction technology as well as the different costs implied 
therein. Since housing represents the most important asset in the 
household's portfolio, and accounts for most of the household's 
investment activity, we felt it important to elaborate on its 
nature, especially in the urban area where issues of migration 
and asset accumulation related to housing may be particularly 
important to the process of development and structural change. 
2.2 Technological Conditions and Factor Inputs 
Like all models of economic dualism, ours stresses production 
dualism. (A complete mathematical statement of the model can be 
found in Appendix A. Equation numbers in the text are consistent 
with those in the appendix.) Thus, the eight sectoral activities 
exhibit quite different rates of technical progress, factor- 
intensity, distributional attributes, and substitution elasticities. 
It is assumed that the production process in all sectors 
(except rural housing) can be described by a continuous, twice- 
differentiable, single-valued function. Conventional physical 
capital, Xi, is used in agriculture, manufacturing, and the modern 
service sector, although it is specific to a given sector once in 
place. Unskilled labor, Lit is used in all sectors except housing, 
and is mobile between them, subject to migration rules to be 
discussed below. Skilled labor, Si, is utilized in the M and KS 
sectors only while land, R, is used as an input in both agriculture 
and urban housing. Each of these four factors of production is 
homogeneous. Production is subject to constant returns to scale 
and diminishing marginal rates of substitution are assumed to 
prevail. Joint products are excluded and external economies 
(and diseconomies) do not exist. It is assumed that factor- 
augmenting technical change applies to capital, skills, and labor 
but not to land. Thus, each sector is analogous to a large firm 
or industry having a production function and exhibiting optimal 
behavior. Such behavior implies cost minimization with respect 
to inputs and revenue maximization with respect to output. 
The production processes in the two modern urban sectors are 
viewed to be more capital-cum-skill intensive than in agriculture. 
The importance of factor intensity differentials has long been 
appreciated since Eckaus (1955) brought it to our attention. He 
argued that in underdeveloped economies agriculture was far less 
capital intensive, which, together with differences in elasticities 
of factor substitution, gave rise to the phenomenon of "technolog- 
ical dualism". We shall impose alternate restrictions consistent 
with his view, namely that the current elasticity of substitution 
i n  urban modern s e c t o r s  i s  less than  one,  whi le  it i s  equal  t o  one 
i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  ( i . e . ,  Cobb-Douglas). There i s  abundant e m p i r i c a l  
evidence suppor t ing  t h i s  view (Chenery and Raduchel, 1971; F a l l o n  
and Layard, 1975; Yotopolous and Nugent, 1976) .  
The modern urban s e c t o r  product ion  f u n c t i o n s  must c a p t u r e  
t h e s e  o v e r a l l  a t t r i b u t e s ,  b u t  t h e  presence of t h r e e  f a c t o r s  of 
product ion  makes t h e  convent iona l  c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  s u b s t i t u -  
t i o n  (CES) product ion  f u n c t i o n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  S ince  it i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e  t o  conf ron t  t h e  i s s u e  of e a r n i n g s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  wi thou t  
paying e x p l i c i t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  l a b o r  he te rogene i ty ,  w e  have i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  t h e  working popu la t ion  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  a t  t h e  very  minimum 
by s k i l l e d  and u n s k i l l e d  l abor .  Furthermore,  w e  a r e  convinced by 
s e v e r a l  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  t h a t  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  of s u b s t i t u t i o n  
between each of t h e  t h r e e  p a i r s  of i n p u t s  i n  t h e s e  modern s e c t o r s  
i s  not t h e  same. Rather ,  we a r e  persuaded t h a t  convent iona l  
c a p i t a l  and s k i l l s  a r e  r e l a t i v e  complements ( G r i l i c h e s ,  1969; 
F a l l o n  and Layard, 1975; Kesselman, Williamson, and Berndt ,  1977) 
and t h a t  t h i s  f a c t  goes  a long way i n  account ing f o r  t h e  phenomena 
of r i s i n g  s k i l l e d  wage premia, "wage s t r e t c h i n g "  (Morley and 
Williamson, 1977) and inc reased  ea rn ings  i n e q u a l i t y  i n  much of  
t h e  Third World where c a p i t a l  accumulation i s  s o  r a p i d .  
Given t h e  need t o  s p e c i f y  modern s e c t o r  product ion  f u n c t i o n s  
t h a t  a l low f o r  r e l a t i v e  complementarity between s k i l l e d  l a b o r  and 
c a p i t a l ,  t h e  u s u a l  CES product ion  f u n c t i o n  cannot  be employed. 
The most u s e f u l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  ou r  purposes i s  t h e  "two-level" 
o r  "nes ted"  CES f i r s t  proposed by Sa to  (1967) and s i n c e  a p p l i e d  
t o  developing economies i n  a number of c a s e  s t u d i e s  (Bowles, 1970; 
F a l l o n  and Layard, 1975; Edmonston, Sanderson, and Sapoznikow, 1976; 
Lysy and Tay lo r ,  1977; Adelman and Robinson, 1978) .  Th i s  f u n c t i o n  
s e p a r a t e s  f a c t o r s  i n t o . g r o u p s  and g e n e r a t e s  an index f o r  one group 
us ing  t h e  CES f u n c t i o n  i n  i t s  u s u a l  form. This  index i s  then  com- 
bined i n  ano the r  CES f u n c t i o n  t o  g e n e r a t e  value-added ou tpu t .  I n  
our  case ,  Q i  i s  a composite index of convent iona l  and human c a p i t a l  
( s k i l l s )  i n p u t s ,  5 1  and 5 .  a r e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  parameters ,  and o j  and 
1 1 
a a r e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  of s u b s t i t u t i o n .  Following Eckaus and t h e  i 
" s t r u c t u r a l i s t s "  (Chenery and Raduchel, 1971) ,  w e  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  
these substitution elasticities will generally fall below unity. 
Furthermore, we anticipate that the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and skilled labor will be significantly less than 
that between unskilled labor and composite capital, thus conforming 
to the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis. The implication 
of this hypothesis is that rapid physical capital accumulation in 
the modern sector tends to raise the demand for skilled relative 
to unskilled labor. Accumulation tends to breed earnings inequal- 
ity in our model as a result. 
Moving from a value-added to a gross-output production func- 
tion where 'intermediate inputs are specified explicitly, we shall 
consider separately those inputs supplied domestically and those 
obtained from abroad. Imported intermediate inputs (Zi), including 
fuel, have been incorporated in both modern sectors. Intermediate 
input demands are almost always captured by fixed coefficients in 
development and planning models. Such Leontief-like specifications 
might be appropriate in short run applications, but they are 
unacceptable in a model covering a twenty to thirty year span, 
especially given the OPEC shocks of the 1970's (Hoffman and 
Jorgenson, 1977; Ferndt and Wood, 1979). Since it is mandatory 
to admit the possibility of economizing on imported raw material 
inputs if the longer run implications of OPEC pricing policies 
are to be sensibly investigated, substitution between imported 
inputs, domestically supplied intermediate inputs and the conven- 
tional primary inputs must be allowed. 
Imported non-competitive inputs are combined with other 
domestic and primary factor inputs following a Cobb-Douglas 
specification. While this specification introduces greater 
flexibility into our economy's structure, aspects of "import 
dependency" associated with modern sector expansion can still be 
investigated with our model. In particular, our specification 
permits analysis of unbalanced sectoral growth on aggregate 
imported intermediate inputsrespecially fuels, given different 
import intensitites by sector. Chenery and Raduchel (1971) have 
demonstrated that the latter can be a relatively important aspect 
of import dependency in a typical developing country. This 
specification also makes it possible to explore the impact of 
changes in the price of such imports on the industrialization and 
urbanization process. Since Zi is imported at exogenous world 
market prices, the impact of changes in such prices, attributable, 
for example, to OPEC policy, can be readily explored. 
The model also allows for domestic intermediate inputs, 
although we take a somewhat restricted view of their importance. 
The output of both traditional service sectors is treated as 
satisfying final demand only, a reasonable assumption since they 
are dominated by domestics, personal services and highly labor- 
intensive low-cost housing construction. Neither of these two 
sectors enters into the intersectoral production flows. The same 
is true of housing services, or the rental stream generated by 
housing stocks. The motivation for the addition of the remaining 
intersectoral production flows is to recognize the direct and 
indirect output mix changes induced by demand or supply changes 
in a given sector. One of our key interests is to account for 
trends in the distribution of income and earnings. By focusing 
on direct factor requirements only, and given factor-intensity 
differences across sectors, we would surely exaggerate induced 
changes in factor demand were we to ignore these direct factor 
requirements induced by the input-output relationships. 
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The two modern sector production functions take the following 
* 
form : 
where Q is gross output in sector i, 
'i is imported raw materials, i 
Qi, j are intersectoral inputs (excluding intrasectoral inputs), 
a are the cost shares of each factor in gross sales, Ti is a i, j 
composite input index of conventional and human capital (skills), 
ti and 5 1  are distribution parameters, and oi and o i  are 
substitution elasticities. Factor-augmenting technical progress 
determines the level of x(t) , y(t) , and z (t) ; xKi, ySil and zLi 
will be referred to as "efficiency capital", "efficiency skilled 
labor", and "efficiency labor" in what follows. 
- 
*Equation numbers correspond with the mathematical statement at 
the back of the paper. 
Agriculture's production function is specified as Cobb-Douglas: 
where QA denotes g r o s s  agricultural output, and RA the endogenously 
determined stock of land, unaugmented by technical progress.* 
Following now standard conventions in the formal literature 
(Mazumdar, 1975), the traditional service sectors utilize unskilled 
labor inputs only. In the absence of sector-specific technological 
change, the average physical product of efficiency labor diminishes 
with the continued application of labor and the law of diminishing 
returns is held to prevail (a.<l). Thus, 
1 
Below we shall assume that labor in the traditional service 
sectors is paid its average  product, thus satisfying product exhaus- 
tion. Since much of the traditional service labor is self-employed 
(barbers, vendors), the difference between average and marginal 
product may be considered as a reward to entrepreneurship. 
Housing services are produced by the combined inputs of 
existing residential structure and land. Housing is obviously 
quite different than the other five commodity and service 
activities since it utilizes neither labor nor "productive" 
capital. Housing is therefore discussed more conveniently as a 
separate topic, in conjunction with land market and optimal land 
use issues. (See section 2.8.) 
*See Binswanger ( 1 9 ? 4 )  on the factor-augmenting attributes of 
agriculture in the American 20th century case. 
2.3. Commodity Prices, Service Prices, 
and Aspects of Tax Policy 
Prices of manufactured and agricultural goods are determined 
exogenously by the combined influences of world market prices 
and the country's commercial policy. Thus, import substitution 
and tariff policy is captured by an equivalent ad vaZorem tariff 
rate, 
'T,M, so that 
- 
where P '  refers to value-added price, M p~ refers to domestic 
selling price, and the country is assumed to be a price taker 
-W in world markets at PM.* This describes the bulk of developing 
countries but excludes most notably those which are endowed with 
exceptional deposits of exportable raw materials, where these 
exports loom large not only in the country's exports, but in 
world trade as well. 
Agriculture is much more difficult to capture with a simple 
model since in reality the Third World is beset with a bewilder- 
ing variety of export taxes, marketing boards, subsidies and 
taxes on purchased inputs (Hayami and Ruttan, 1 9 7 1 ;  Johnston and 
Kilby, 1975;  Schultz, 1 9 7 8 ) .  Our "representative" economy is 
assumed to have the following attributes regarding agricultural 
markets: the country is a price taker, subsides and taxes are 
*It should also be noted that per unit value addez-prices should 
exhaust total factor payments per unit of output. Thus, 
- 
- 
- 
Pk = w MIS a ~ , ~  + W ~ , ~  a ~ , ~  + rM aMIK a P M,F M 
where wM are wage rates, rM is the return to capital, and a . 
M, I 
is the endogenous input-output ratio of factor j to value added. 
Similar conditions hold for all other sectors. 
applied to purchased inputs from manufacturing (e.g., fertilizer), 
and export taxes are common. Thus, domestic agricultural prices 
. are exogenous and "distorted" by policy in the following way: 
where PA refers to the domestic selling price, refers to the 
value added price (received by farmers),~, is an average 1tX 
ad v a l o r e m  equivalent export tax, and T A,M refers to the domestic 
tax or subsidy on purchased inputs in the agricultural sector. 
The relative magnitudes of these two taxes will determine the 
extent to which agriculture is "squeezed". 
The treatment of the export tax may be made more transparent. 
The value of exports expressed in domestic prices (FA XA) is taxed 
at the rate T 
TI X 
so that 
which with some simple manipulation yields equation (11). An 
increase in this tax serves to diminish domestic output, increase 
domestic demand at the lower domestic prices (a source of subsidy 
to the urban workforce at the farmer's expense), diminish exports, 
but may or may not change government tax revenues depending on 
domestic demand and supply elasticities. This can be seen in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Partial equilibrium analysis of the export. tax. 
The remaining prices in our model (rural services, 
'RS ; 
urban traditional services, PUS; urban modern services, PKS) are 
all determined endogenously where, in addition, 
following the same notation as above. (Rents are discussed in 
Section 2.8.) There are other commodity taxes present in the 
model, but since they appear as expenditure or sales taxes, we 
need not discuss them anti1 we confront the governnent sector 
(Section 2.10) and the private sector demand system 
(Section 2.113 below. 
One possible extension of the model would be to include 
transport costs, thereby providing an added regional dimension. 
There is accumulating evidence, however, that simple modeling of 
transportation yields little insight or impact in general equilib- 
rium systems of this type. In a study of Indian economic 
development, for example, Rakesh Mohan (1 977) highlighted 
transport costs in an attempt to gain insight into intersectoral 
commodity flows, factor migration, and urbanization. Mohan 
regarded transport as an intermediate good produced by the 
industrial sector. Transport demand originated from movements 
of final and intermediate goods between urban and rural areas, 
and regional commodity prices differed by a factor of proportion- 
ality to reflect transport margins. Simulation experiments 
revealed a negligible impact even when transport margins were 
increased fivefold. Williamson and DeBever (1977) have also 
experimented with transport margins in a general equilibrium 
model of Japanese historical development. Their formulation 
focused on the cost of moving agricultural goods to urban markets 
As with the Indian case, Williamson and DeBever trade margins had 
little quantitative impact on the course of Japanese growth and 
structural change. 
Based on these and other findings, we are reluctant to 
include interregional transportation in the present model. To 
do so properly would involve data requirements on transportation 
production activities, as well as product-specific trade margins, 
that are extremely scarce for most developing countries. And the 
studies cited above have already shown that simple formulations 
of transport costs yield little added insight and negligible 
quantitative impact. 
2.4 Labor Demand, Labor Supply 
and Wage Determination 
Economy-wide supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are 
exogenously given at any point in time in the static model. This 
is not true over time, of course, since skills are augmented 
endogenously (Section 2.7) and unskilled labor grows in response 
to long-run demographic forces (Section 2.14). Although total 
labor supplies are given by previous history in the static model, 
the distribution of the labor force over space and across sectors 
is not. The next section will analyze the migration behavior 
embedded in the model which determines labor allocation. The 
present section will focus on labor demand and wage determination 
in the absence of migration forces. 
There are five sectors that employ unskilled labor: 
where LR is the total rural unskilled labor force and LU is the 
total urban unskilled labor force. Overt unemployment is not an 
attribute of our model since very few unskilled laborers in the 
Third World can afford the luxury, having few or no assets to 
finance significant periods of overt unemployment. Apparently 
this characteristic holds true even for rural immigrants to some 
Third World cities since the evidence suggests that they secure 
employment relatively soon after arrival (Yotopoulos, 1977, chp.6; 
Yap, 1976, 1977). Low-productivity underemployment in the 
traditional service sectors appears to offer a better measure of 
the extent of labor surplus (Mazumdar, 1975). 
With the exception of the two labor-intensive service 
sectors, efficiency factors are assumed to be paid their marginal 
value products, provided that at each point in time the marginal 
value product of efficiency labor in each sector is sufficient 
to allow every member of the unskilled labor force to consume at 
levels that satisfy subsistence. We interpret "subsistence" to 
be the level of per capita consumption considered by households 
to be essential for their welfare. This minimum l'evel of consump- 
tion will be defined explicitly when we turn to the household 
demand system, but for the moment we shall assume that it is above 
the caloric level at which starvation occurs, and that it also 
exceeds levels at which marginal increases in consumption 
significantly influence productivity, efficiency, and thus 
earnings. (See Fei and Chiang, 1966; Mirrless, 1975.) 
Defining GinL to be the wage per efficiency unskilled laborer 
in the ith secto;, annual earnings can be denoted by w = z G  i,L it L 
where, we will recall, z is a factor of augmentation through 
technical change (or utilization). Thus, wage equations for these 
five sectors can be written as 
- 
i = M,'KS and where P i  = PA 
Note that marginal product pricing does not hold in the informal 
service sectors, but rather average value prcduct determines 
wages there. It may be appealing to view wage determination in 
traditional services as the result of income sharing. Alterna- 
tively, the output produced above the laborer's marginal product 
may be considered a premium to entrepreneurship distributed back 
to the laborers - a view consistent with the fact that self- 
employment and family enterprise dominates this sector. 
It might be helpful to emphasize two issues at this point: 
the distinction between wage rates and annual earnings, on the 
one hand, and the structure of earnings by occupation-sector, on 
the other. Both of these issues are important to income distribu- 
tion patterns generated by the model. First, we have shown 
elsewhere that wage rates and earnings can behave quite differently 
over time in the developing economy, depending in large part on 
the character of technical progress. (See Kelley, Williamson, and 
Cheetham, 1972, chps. 4,5, and 8). As we shall see in Section 
2.13, labor-saving technological change implies rapid increases 
in z, an influence that serves to suppress the rise in the real 
wage rate, confirming the historical evidence of wage stability. 
Yet that influence also seems to drive a wedge between wage rates 
and annual earnings, the latter rising even in the face of wage 
rate stability. Thus, stability in the wage rate of efficiency 
unskilled labor does not necessarily imply stability in wage 
earnings or, for that matter, stability in unskilled labor's 
share. Second, our choice of migration rules will be crucial in 
determining the structure of earnings among the unskilled in our 
model. If we were to assume complete factor mobility between 
sectors and thus wage equalization, there would be no room for 
anything other than a fully egalitarian distribution of unskilled 
earnings: all earnings inequality would take the form of wage 
differentials between skilled and unskilled labor. Migration 
specifications become important, therefore, to the distribution 
patterns generated in any model of Third World economies. 
Equations (19)-(23) can be readily converted into sectoral 
(unskilled) labor requirements, demand conditions that are central 
to issues of employment, labor migration, income distribution, and 
urbanization. Sectoral unskilled labor demands are therefore 
written as the combined influence of technology, output levels, 
and, of course, real wages themselves: 
I t  s h o u l d  be c l e a r  from t h e s e  l a b o r  demand f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  wage 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  v a r y  a c r o s s  s e c t o r s ,  b e i n g  h i g h e r  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  
( u n i t y )  t h a n  i n  t h e  modern s e c t o r s  where oi i s  u s u a l l y  less t h a n  
u n i t y  . 
Cons ide r  n e x t  t h e  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  marke t .  S k i l l e d  l a b o r  
s u p p l i e s ,  S f  a r e  g i v e n  a t  some exogenous l e v e l  i n  t h e  s t a t i c  model ,  
depending on p r e v i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  s k i l l  a c c u m u l a t i o n .  S i n c e  
s k i l l e d  l a b o r  i s  u t i l i z e d  o n l y  i n  t h e  two modern u rban  s e c t o r s  
it f o l l o w s  t h a t  
D e f i n i n g  Pi , t o  b e  t h e  wage p e r  e f f i c i e n c y  s k i l l e d  l a b o r e r  i n  t h e  
i t h  s e c t o r ,  h i s  a n n u a l  e a r n i n g s  c a n  b e  d e n o t e d  by w i t s  - 
- *its 
where y  is a f a c t o r  o f  augmenta t ion  comparable  t o  t h a t  f o r  u n s k i l l -  
ed  l a b o r .  Once a g a i n  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  are invoked 
s o  t h a t  
- 
( 2 5 )  
i = M,KS and where PI 
= PA M 
A s  w i t h  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r ,  t h e s e  two wage e q u a t i o n s  c a n  b e  c o n v e r t e d  
i n t o  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  demand f u n c t i o n s :  
2.5 Labor Migration and Wage "~aps" 
Research on the determinants of labor migration in developing 
economies has proceeded along two lines. The first has its source 
in formal dualistic labor transfer models where the treatment of 
migration has typically been quite simplistic. The Lewis (19541, 
Fei-Ranis (1961), Jorgenson (1961, 1967), and Kelley-Williamson- 
Cheetham (1972) models ail exploit the hypothesis that current 
wage differentials induce labor migration between sectors. Since 
the significance of wage differentials as a determinant of migra- 
tion is well documented (Beals et al. 1967; Sahota, 1968; Yap, 
1976b), the hypothesis would hardly seem contestable. Yet this 
evidence hardly justifies the extreme but common assumption in the 
general equilibrium literature that wages are in fact equalized by 
the process of migration. In fact, nominal wage equalization is not 
observed in the Third World (Reynolds, 1965; Johnston and Neilsen, 
1966; Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974), although the lion's share of 
the observed nominal wage "gaps" appears to be due to skill and 
cost-of -living differences (on the alleged Brazilian " low-wage" 
Northeast, see Fishlow, 1972; on the alleged American "low-wage" 
South, see Bellante, 1979). Since it is widely recognized that 
wage differentials are not the sole determinant of migration, and 
that all determinants are not necessarily economic, we cannot adopt 
wholesale the simple wage equalization assumptions of the simpler 
general equilibrium models in a more policy-oriented framework, 
especially one like ours which focuses on the urbanization process. 
A second line of thought extends the classical treatment of 
the migration decision. dither it includes an urban unemployment 
(or underemployment) variable, and thus focuses on expected annual 
earnings differentials (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todardo, 1970; 
Zarembka, 1972; Corden and Findlay, 1975), or it utilizes a 
capital theoretical framework that explicitly introduces present 
value calculations, migration costs, job search, and distribution 
lags (Sjaastad, 1962; Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham, 1972; 
Williamson and DeBever, 1977). In particular, the Todardo frame- 
work has enjoyed considerable popularity over the past decade and 
and there have been many attempts to introduce his hypothesis 
into static and dynamic intersectoral development models. 
The Todaro hypothesis is simple and elegant. While similar 
statements can be found elsewhere (Harris and Todaro, 1970; 
Stiglitz, 1974), the most effective illustration can be found in 
Corden and Findlay (1975) reproduced in Figure 2 assuming perfect 
capital mobility. There are only two sectors analyzed, but they 
are sufficient to illustrate the point. Under the extreme assump- 
tion of wage equalization through migration, and in the absence 
of wage rigidities, equilibrium is achieved at E (the point of 
intersection of the two labor demand curves, AA' and MM'). 
* * * 
Here wA = w and the urbanization rate is OMLM/L, where M denotes M 
the manufacturing sector and A denotes agriculture. In addition, 
the Corden-Findlay model incorporates the widely-held belief that 
the wage rate in Third World manufacturing sectors is "pegged" at 
artificially high levels, say at w M ' If overt unemployment is 
assumed away, then all who fail to secure the favored jobs in the 
**  
M sector would accept lower paying jobs in the A-sector at wA . 
Figure 2. The Harris-Todaro-Corden-Findlay Model. 
- 
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Clearly, the level of employment in the urban sector has been 
choked off'by the high wage in manufacturing and both migration 
and urbanization have been forestalled. As Todaro initially 
pointed out, however, urbanization rates have been dramatic in 
the Third World and furthermore there has been an expansion in 
traditional urban service underemployment (see also Sabot, 1975; 
Mazumdar, 1975; Rogers, 1977; Merrick, 1978). Todaro explains 
this apparent conflict (e.g., migration in the face of urban 
underemployment) by developing an expectations hypothesis which 
in its simplest form states that the favored jobs are allocated 
by "lottery", that the potential migrant calculates the expected 
value of that lottery ticket, and compares it with the certain 
employment in the rural sector. Migration then takes place until 
the urban expected wage is equated to the rural wage. Given the 
- 
"pegged" wM, at what rural wage would the migrant be indifferent 
between "underemployment" in the traditional urban service sector 
and employment in the agricultural sector? If his probability of 
getting the favored job is simply the ratio of LM to the total 
urban labor pool, LU, then the expression 
indicates the agricultural wage at which he is indifferent 
between employment locations. .This is in fact the qq' curve in 
Figure 2. The equilibrium agricultural wage, w and urban A' 
underemployment (e.g., the size of the traditional, unorganized 
sector) is thus given at z . *  
While this conventional wisdom is elegant, we adopt it here 
only with qualifications. These qualifications are motivated by 
the following observations. First, we are not convinced that w M 
*The Harris-Todaro curve, qq', is a rectangular hyperbola with 
unitary elasticity. The elasticity of the labor demand curve in 
the urban "modern" sectors is assumed to be less than unity in 
Figure 2 according to our expectations revealed in Section 2.4. 
c a n  be viewed a s  "pegged" i n  t h e  Th i rd  World and independen t  of 
marke t  f o r c e s .  (See  Mazumdar, 1975; House and ~ e m p l e ,  1978; 
Henley and House, 1978. )  P u t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  a p p a r e n t  wage 
r i g i d i t y  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  ( u n i o n s ,  government 
r e g u l a t i o n s )  may i n  f a c t  be  e x p l a i n e d  by marke t  f o r c e s ,  w i t h  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  mere ly  responding  t o  t h o s e  f o r c e s  ( T a y l o r ,  1979, c h p . 5 ) .  
I n  any c a s e ,  w e  have  no way of  p r o j e c t i n g  such  a f i x e d  wage i n t o  
t h e  f u t u r e ,  and w i t h o u t  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  dynamic a n a l y s i s  i s  
s o r e l y  l i m i t e d .  Second, w e  a g r e e  w i t h  W i l l i s  (1979) t h a t  t h e  
l o t t e r y  view of  who g e t s  f a v o r e d  jobs  i s  n a i v e  and i g n o r e s  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s .  I t  seems t o  u s  t h a t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  new j o b  
v a c a n c i e s  i n  t h e  f a v o r e d  s e c t o r s  i s  h a r d l y  random, b u t  r a t h e r  
v e r y  much a  f u n c t i o n  o f  b r i b e s ,  nepot ism,  employment s e a r c h  c o s t s ,  
un ion  d u e s ,  and t h e  l i k e .  Tha t  i s ,  t h e s e  f a v o r e d  j obs  have  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  e a r n i n g  r e n t s  t h a t  command a n  i m p l i c i t  o r  
e x p l i c i t  p r i c e .  T h i r d ,  t h e  Todaro f o r m u l a t i o n  i g n o r e s  t h e  obv ious  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  f avo red  jobs  a r e  more s k i l l - i n t e n s i v e  
t h a n  e i t h e r  f a rm l a b o r  o r  t r a d i t i o n a l  u rban  s e r v i c e  a c t i v i t y .  
F i n a l l y ,  and w e  t h i n k  most  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  i g n o r e s  
c o s t - o f - l i v i n g  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between r e g i o n s .  
Our own approach  i s  a  h y b r i d  which a t t e m p t s  t o  m e e t  a t  l e a s t  
some of  t h e s e  criticisms. On t h e  one  hand, w e  assume p e r f e c t  
m o b i l i t y  of  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  w i t h i n  t h e  r u r a l  s e c t o r  s i n c e  everyone  
seems t o  a g r e e  t h a t  f r e e  e n t r y  and c o s t l e s s  m o b i l i t y  are reason-  
a b l e  a p p rox ima t ions  t h e r e .  W e  make t h e  same assumpt ion  f o r  b o t h  
s k i l l e d  and u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  between t h e  two modern u rban  s e c t o r s ,  
c e r t a i n l y  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  p remise  t o  t h e  Todaro a d h e r e n t s  g i v e n  
t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a g g r e g a t e  a l l  modern s e c t o r  a c t i v i t i e s .  
Thus, 
.-- G A I L  = w  RS, L 
- - 
W = w  MIS KS,S 
.-- 
- 
.-- 
W 
MIL - W ~ ~ , ~  . 
On the other hand, we model the unskilled wage gap between tradi- 
tional urban services and the modern sectors by inserting an 
exogenous differential, K ,  that reflects the costs of the property 
right as discussed above. Thus, 
- 
w = = K G  
MIL KS,L US, L (28 
Finally, and the most important, the rural-urban migration 
process must be specified. Here we adopt a position which is 
closer in spirit to the Todaro hypothesis, but, we feel, with 
more to defend it. The potential rural-urban migrant is assumed 
..d to behave as if he calculates an expected urban nominal wage, w u '  
This wage is simply the weighted average of potential urban 
urlskilled earnings and skilled earnings (net of taxes), where the 
weights are marginal probabilities rather than average probabili- 
ties as in the simple Corden-Findlay version. Thus, 
where T is the income tax rate on high-wage skilled labor. The Y 
migrant has accessible current information on city wages, but not 
on his employment probabilities. Thus employment weights are 
lagged one year in the migrant's calculation of expected urban 
income.* In summary, the migrant is induced into the cities 
*In our specification of skill augmentation and training (section 
2.7, equation (go)), we introduce a longer lag for migrants in 
obtaining skilled employment. For simplicity, this feature has 
been suppressed in the migration equation, since it would 
introduce unnecessary complexity of little empirical consequence. 
with the anticipation of having the chance of gaining one of two 
favored modern sector jobs: either unskilled employment at a 
higher wage rate, or training and thus (perhaps subsequently) 
skilled employment at an even higher wage. Training and skills 
creation will be discussed in Section 2.7 when we confront the 
dynamic specifications in the model. 
Finally, we assume that the migrant is not motivated solely 
by nominal (expected) wage gaps, but rather by r e a l  income 
differentials. Thus, 
where the location-specific cost-of-living indices, COLi, are 
influenced by price differentials for nontradeables as well as 
budget weights. This specification will be discussed at greater 
length when the household demand system is elaborated in Section 
2.11. 
In summary, our model is capable of generating an endogenous 
earnings structure in four dimensions: rural unskilled earnings, 
urban traditional sector unskilled earnings, modern sector 
unskilled earnings, and skilled earnings. The wage spread over 
these employment categories will be determined hy the endogenous 
forces of market demand, supply, and the migration process itself. 
The speed of urbanization will be determined by the same set of 
forces. While expectations of favored sector employment may well 
generate the Todaro result of "overurbanization", it is also 
possible that cost-of-living influences may choke off that 
tendency without the overt introduction of government policy. 
The issue is an empirical one. 
2.6 "Productive" Capital Markets 
Our assumption that efficiency factors are paid their 
marginal value products applies not only to labor, but to physical 
captial as well. Thus, the sectoral rates of return to capital, 
ri are written as 
We assume capital immobility, so after tax rates of return 
need not be equalized between sectors. That is, once investment 
is allocated to a given sector and used to augment the capital 
stock there, the new stock of capital becomes specific to that 
production activity. Thus, any economic event that serves to 
raise the rate of return in one sector relative to another will 
tend to generate rate of return differentials, a disequilibrium 
attribute typical of most developing economies, and often 
labelled as "market failure". On the other hand, we assume that 
the current pool of productive investment goods can be allocated 
freely between sectors. Indeed both private investors and 
government authorities are assumed to allocate current saving 
(excluding, of course, that earmarked for housing investment) 
so as to minimize'rate of return differentials. The rate of 
return differentials minimized, however, are not simply the net 
returns on existing capital, since these are determined primarily 
by the sectoral capital stocks that are fixed in the current time 
period. Rather, private and public agents form expectations of 
projected rates of return based on investment plans that will 
s e r v e  t o  augment s e c t o r a l  c a p i t a l  s t o c k s  i n  t h e  nex t  t ime p e r i o d .  
Thus, t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  minimized by c u r r e n t  inves tment  a l l o c a t i o n  
d e c i s i o n s  might be c a l l e d  e x  a n t e  n e t  ( a f t e r  t a x )  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  
o r  q u a s i - r e n t s .  Formal ly ,  where t h e  r n  a r e  " c o r p o r a t e "  t a x  
t i  
r a t e s  ( T  
I I t M  > T n , ~ ~  ) we wish t o  
such t h a t  
where 
The e x  a n t e  ( a f t e r  t a x )  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  a r e  t h u s  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  
combined impact of t h e  c u r r e n t  n e t  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  i n  s e c t o r  
i t  [zi - 6 .  PM], p l u s  t h e  expected impact of c u r r e n t  n e t  i n v e s t -  
1 
ment a l l o c a t i o n s ,  y 1 i t M  - 6. 1 K i l t  on t h a t  r a t e  of r e t u r n .  
I t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e ,  indeed l i k e l y ,  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  n e t  
inves tment  pool  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e q u a l i z e  t h e s e  q u a s i - r e n t s ,  
and d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between e x  p o s t  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  may p e r s i s t  
o r  i n c r e a s e  over  p e r i o d s  of t ime.  Even s o ,  some r e a d e r s  might  
wish t o  s e e  more ev idence  of  c a p i t a l  market  f ragmenta t ion  and 
i n e f f e c t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a t i o n  in t roduced  i n t o  t h e  model. 
Indeed, there is a growing empirical literature which emphasizes 
capital market fragmentation (Gurley and Shaw, 1955, 1956, 1967; 
Patrick, 1966; Shaw, 1973), although development economists have 
found it difficult to model the process (McKinnon, 1973; de Melo, 
1976, 1977). We certainly agree with this emphasis. As a result, 
critical elements of capital market imperfection and fragmentation 
are introduced explicitly into the model when we consider invest- 
ment in human skills in Section 2.7 (individuals cannot borrow to 
finance skill acquisition), as well as investment in housing in 
Section 2.8 (households are restricted to "self-finance" and 
mortgage markets are nonexistent). Given these several elements 
of capital market fragmentation, we consider it relatively un- 
productive to add more capital market "realism" to our model at 
this point. In an earlier work (Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham 
1972, chp.7), we did make an effort to formulate a disequilibrium 
dualistic model which incorporated capital market imperfections in 
the allocation of conventional physical capital. That exercise 
pointed out the heavy empirical requirements which this "move 
towards realism" implies. It also underscored the ad izoc devices 
used in the literature to circumvent the explicit sstimation of 
key parameters. The most popular device has its origin with 
Rosa Luxemberg (1969), who assumed that all rental income was 
reinvested in the sector of origin. Many have followed in her 
footsteps, a recent example offered by Yap (1972) t who assumed 
that 80 percent of a given sector's savings was reinvested while 
the remaining 20 percent was allocated in response to rates of 
return. We do not find these ad hoe approaches to capital market 
fragmentation appealing, and believe that the assumptions embedded 
in our basic model supply the best starting place for an analysis 
of Third World urbanization and distribution. For example, 
capital market imperfections in the skill acquisition process are 
already in our model; the absence of a mortgage market is also 
there; and the immobility of current stocks of physical (productive) 
capital adds another market-clearing constraint. All of these 
capital market attributes are likely to produce the relevant 
stylized facts of Third World development: persistent rate of 
return differentials, sectors "starved" for funds, heavy reliance 
on self-generated funds, high reinvestment rates, "thin" inter- 
sectoral savings flows, and an urban investment bias. The latter 
is assured since increasing government expenditures can be 
satisfied in our model only by the expansion of the KS sector 
(e.9. , education, health, defense, communications) , and increases 
in the KS sector's output implies a rise in investment require- 
ments there (e.g., the construction of school buildings, medical 
facilities, harbors, airports, roads). By definition, such 
investment is urban based. There are also other forces in our 
model which are likely to make the rural sector appear "starved1' 
for funds. 
Finally, in the remainder of this exposition we shall find 
it useful to make reference to an "economy-wide discount rate". 
In what follows, this percentage rate will be defined as the 
average net (after taxes, excluding depreciation requirements) 
rate of return to "productive" physical capital. Equation (35) 
supplies the calculation where sectoral capital stocks are used 
as weights in computing the average: 
2.7 Education, 'I-aining, and Skills Accumulation 
The availability of skilled labor can have a potent impact 
on growth and distribution. Slow rates of growth in the stock of 
skills can constrain expansion in the two modern sectors where 
skilled labor is utilized in production. Demand shifts favoring 
these skill-intensive sectors will serve to raise the skill 
premium, and produce "wage stretching" and earnings inequality 
(Chiswick, 1974;  Phelps-Brown, 1 9 7 7 ) .  The importance of a 
possible skills "bottleneck" depends critically on the degree to 
which u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  and c a p i t a l  c an  b e  u sed  a s  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  
s k i l l s .  Debate on  t h i s  i s s u e  h a s  been e x t e n s i v e  and u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  
d i v i d e d  i n t o  t w o  camps: t h e  manpower " s t r u c t u r a l i s t s "  who see 
l i t t l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between l a b o r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
s k i l l s ,  and t h e i r  opponents  who a r g u e  on  t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h a t  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e  v e r y  h i g h  between l a b o r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
s k i l l s  ( B o w l e s ,  1970) .  The i s s u e  h a s  a p p a r e n t l y  been r e s o l v e d  
by r e c e n t  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  ( G r i l i c h e s ,  1969; F a l l o n  and 
Layard,  1975; Kesselman, Wil l iamson,  and Be rnd t ,  1977) which f i n d s  
e l a s t i c i t i e s  w i t h  i n t e r m e d i a t e  v a l u e s ,  These r e s u l t s  have been 
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  
above i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 2 .  
The impor tance  of  a  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  b o t t l e n e c k  a l s o  depends on 
t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  s k i l l  accumula t ion  t o  demand c o n d i t i o n s .  S k i l l  
f o rma t ion  r a t e s  a r e  a  f u n c t i o n  of  t h r e e  f o r c e s  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
which f o l l o w s :  t h e  s t o c k  o f  " t r a i n a b l e "  u rban  l a b o r ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
s c a r c i t y  of  s k i l l s  (measured most  commonly by t h e  s k i l l  premium) 
which o f f e r s  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  engage i n  t r a i n i n g ,  and t h e  l e v e l  o f  
government e x p e n d i t u r e s  on  fo rmal  e d u c a t i o n  which i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  
e a s e  w i t h  which " t r a i n a b l e s "  can  i n  f a c t  b e  conve r t ed  t o  s k i l l e d  
l a b o r .  W e  a r e  aware t h a t  many T h i r d  World economies appea r  t o  
e x h i b i t  a  g l u t  o f  fo rmal  s c h o o l  g r a d u a t e s .  The s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
which f o l l o w s  i s  des igned  t o  accoun t  f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f  Th i rd  World 
e x p e r i e n c e ,  s i n c e  t h e  model may g e n e r a t e  abundance o r  s c a r c i t y  of 
t h o s e  f o r m a l l y  schooled .  I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  s t o c k  o f  t r a i n a b l e s  w i l l  
be  l i m i t e d  t o  ul-ban workers  on ly .  T h i s  seems r ea sonab l e :  r u r a l  
workers ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g ,  must f i r s t  m i g r a t e  
t o  u rban  a r e a s  b e f o r e  be ing  cons ide red  f o r  t r a i n i n g .  T h i s  i n  
i t s e l f  s u p p l i e s  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  m i g r a t e .  Fur thermore ,  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  such  e d u c a t i o n  i s  more a c c e s s i b l e  i n  t h e  c i t y ,  a  
household head may w e l l  m i g r a t e  t o  i n s u r e  t h e  e d u c a t i o n  o f  h i s  
c h i l d r e n  (a  mot ive  perhaps  m i s l a b e l e d  a s  " b r i g h t  l i g h t s " ) .  
How, t h e n ,  i s  t h e  s k i l l s  a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s  modeled i n  o u r  
economy? W e  s h a l l  assume t h e  t r a i n i n g  t o  be f i n a n c e d  by t h e  
i n d u s t r i e s  which u t i l i z e  s k i l l e d  l a b o r .  E i t h e r  due  t o  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
funds  imp l i ed  by c a p i t a l  marke t  i m p e r f e c t i o n s  o r  due  t o  t h e  absence  
of an effective "private schooling industry" or both, we shall 
assume that individuals cannot gain access to training unless 
selected for such training by firms who find it profitable to 
make such investments. The full cost of the training is therefore 
borne by the industries rather than the individual. (Trainees do 
bear the time cost of training, but only in foregone leisure.) 
Furthermore, we shall treat the two industries as if in collusion 
on their training investments, and neither industry tries to ob- 
tain a "free ride." by simply hiring newly skilled workers after 
the other industry has made the necessary investments. Both in- 
dustries invest in training (if profitable) and they jointly 
share the fruits of that investment. 
The procedure involves first determining the returns to 
investment in training (and thus the demand function for skills), 
second determining the costs of training (and thus the supply 
function for skills), and third determining the supply of workers 
actually trained. Given the latter, the training activity can be 
priced and thus the total investment requirements computed. 
These investment requirements become one component of the current 
saving pool. The economy therefore accumulates three types of 
long-lived assets - physical capital, housing, and skills. 
We are conscious of the fact that the KS sector relies more 
heavily on skilled workers drawn directly from the formal educa- 
tion sector (clerks, bureaucrats, teachers, and doctors) , while 
the M sector normally relies more heavily on blue collar workers 
who acquire skill by on-the-job training. Yet, our simplification 
does not appear to be totally inappropriate. Public education is 
determined in part by government investment decisions, and thus 
the formal-education-using KS sector can also be viewed in the 
same light as the M sector. Moreover, considerable training may 
even be required in government activity to convert the formally 
educated student into a worker of more immediate use. 
After taxes, total profits in industry j (j=M,KS) are simply 
r.(l-rn .)Kj. Total profits are augmented by the marginal I I 
a d d i t i o n  o f  one  more t r a i n e d  s k i l l e d  worker a s  f o l l o w s :  
With p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  s t o c k s  f i x e d  i n  t h ?  s h o r t  r u n ,  
where OS . i s  t h e  ma rg ina l  a f t e r  t a x  revenue  from t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  
r 3 
one  s k i l l e d  worker .  
For  p u rpose s  o f  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  assume f o r  t h e  moment t h a t  
t h e  p e r  u n i t  c o s t s  o f  t r a i n i n g  a  worker i s  c o n s t a n t  a t  c ,  a  
pa ramete r  o v e r  which t h e  government h a s  some c o n t r o l .  These  are 
m a r g i n a l  !and a v e r a g e )  c o s t s  common t o  b o t h  i n d u s t r i e s .  While 
t h e s e  t r a i n i n g  costs a re  a l l  i n c u r r e d  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  t i m e  p e r i o d ,  
t h e  revenue  s t r e a m  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t h roughou t  t h e  working l i f e  o f  
t h e  s k i l l e d  worker .  W e  s h a l l  assume t h a t  f i r m s  f i n d  it  p r o f i t a b l e  
t o  t r a i n  o n l y  young workers  w i t h  a l ong  working l i f e .  For  
c o m p u t a t i o na l  s i m p l i c i t y ,  w e  s h a l l  a l s o  assume t h a t  f i r m s c o m p u t e  
t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  t h e s e  a n t i c i p a t e d  r e t u r n s  assuming ( 1 )  n a i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h a t  as s h a l l  p r e v a i l  i n d e f i n i t e l y  and ( 2 )  t h a t  
, j 
t h e  young s k i l l e d  laborer c a n  be viewed f a t  l e a s t  approx imate ly ! )  
as a n  a s s e t  w i t h  i n f i n i t e  l i f e .  The r e s u l t i n g  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  of 
t h e  b e n e f i t  s t r e a m  g e n e r a t e d  by c u r r e n t  i nves tmen t  i n  t r a i n i n g  
is  ' s imply  
where i i s  t h e  economy-wide d i s c o u n t  r a t e ,  t a k e n  h e r e  a s  t h e  
weighted  a v e r a g e  of  r e t u r n s  t o  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  
s e c t o r s .  Thus, w e  have e x p l i c i t l y  i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  
training must compete with alternative investments in economy- 
wide physical accumulation. Presumably, the firm is indifferent 
between investment in training and alternative modes of 
accumulation such that current costs and capitalized benefits 
are equated: 
What determines the stock of potential trainables? Generally, 
this includes all of last year's unskilled workers (excluding 
deaths and retirements) plus all new entrants who are children of 
urban households, but excludes any of this year's rural inmigrants. 
The exclusion of recent inmigrants is based on a "two-staged" view 
of inmigration: only those unskilled who have already had some 
exposure to urban work are considered trainable by modern sector 
firms. The urban unskilled are also distinguished by level of 
formal education, the latter dictated by previous government edu- 
cational policy and the demographic structure of the urban popula- 
tion. Thus, the stock of urban trainables by formal educational 
achievement is, in the current period, determined exogenously. 
Furthermore, we shall assume that the trainability of the urban 
unskilled worker is a function of formal education: those with 
high formal educational attainment tend to be relatively cheap to 
train. A "step" cost function of the following kind is postulated: 
\ 
c 0 < S LLUt0, k = 0, Ed > n years 0' - 
c = :I' L ~ . ~  C ~ < L  k = I, n-1 < ~d < n 
- UI1' - 
Cn' L ~ , n - ~  < s - < L ~ , ~ ,  k = n ,  Ed = 0 I 
where k r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  formal  educa t ion  c l a s s  (k=O denot ing  
h i g h e s t  a t t a i n m e n t ) ,  and t h e  t o t a l  t r a i n a b l e s  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  
where 2 i s  t h e  op t ima l  c l a s s  t r a i n e d  s a t i s f y i n g  (91)  and (92)  
and a r e  t o t a l  workers t r a i n e d .  
F igu re  3 p o r t r a y s  t h e  t r a i n i n g  market .  A n t i c i p a t e d  r e t u r n s  
and t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  d i c t a t e  t h e  agg rega t e  demand f u n c t i o n  f o r  
t r a i n i n g .  High a n t i c i p a t e d  r e t u r n s  g e n e r a t e  bouyant demands i n  
t h e  two i n d u s t r i e s  combined; such h igh  a n t i c i p a t e d  r e t u r n s  may 
man i f e s t  themselves  i n  s k i l l  " b o t t l e n e c k s "  w i th  s i z e a b l e  s k i l l  
premia. Low r a t e s  of r e t u r n  t o  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  investment  i n  
A ,  1:s and M would y i e l d  t h e  same r e s u l t :  investment  i n  t r a i n i n g  
would appear  r e l a t i v e l y  p r o f i t a b l e .  F igu re  3  i l l u s t r a t e s  two 
A 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  A t  p o i n t  X ,  demand (ri) i s  s l a c k  and a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
sha re  of  t h o s e  i n  t h e  k=l e d u c a t i o n a l  c l a s s  would f i n d  themselves  
g l u t t i n g  t h e  market  and t h u s  employed a t  u n s k i l l e d  t a s k s .  ( I n  t h e  
k=l c l a s s  AB workers w i l l  be t r a i n e d  and BC w o r ~ e r s  w i l l  remain 
u n t r a i n e d . )  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  a t  p o i n t  Y ,  a  much l a r g e r  s h a r e  of  
t hose  w i t h  formal  educa t ion  a r e  t r a i n e d  a s  s k i l l e d  workers,  
l e av ing  perhaps  on ly  e lementary  school  g r a d u a t e s  (k=2) and 
dropouts  p l u s  i l l i t e r a t e s  (k=3) i n  u n s k i l l e d  jobs .  Note t o o  t h a t  
an  expansion i n  demand f o r  s k i l l e d  workers may i n  some circ1;mstance 
be  m e t  w i t h  a  rise i n  s k i l l e d  wages and no a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  
( Y  to Z ) ,  whi l e  i n  o t h e r  c i r cums tances  t h e  t r a i n i n g  r a t e  may r ise 
( X  t o  Y ) .  The s t o c k  of t r a i n a b l e s  by k c l a s s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
h e i g h t  of t h e  " s t e p "  i n  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  bo th  m a t t e r  t o  t h i s  
r e s u l t .  

T o t a l  t r a i n i n g  c o s t s ,  o r  t o t a l  i nves tmen t  i n  t r a i n i n g ,  c a n  
b e  w r i t t e n  i n  e i t h e r  o f  two ways: 
TRAINING COSTS = 1 ck L U t k  k + c , L i - l ~ u , k l  k 1 
TRAINING COSTS = PKS IS t K S  (95)  
These  t r a i n i n g  c o s t s  must  l a y  c l a i m  on  some r e a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  
econoniy; t h a t  i s ,  some " c a p i t a l  goods" s e c t o r  must  a l l o c a t e  
r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h a t  i nves tmen t  a c t i v i t y  and t h e  i n v e s t i n g  f i r m ' s  
t r a i n i n g  c o s t  ( " t u i t i o n " )  must  a c c r u e  a s  income t o  some s e c t o r .  
A s  i s  a p p a r e n t  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 9 5 ) ,  it seems s e n s i b l e  t o  u s  t o  
a s s i g n  t h i s  c a p i t a l  goods a c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  KS s e c t o r  s i n c e ,  a f t e r  
a l l ,  KS i n c l u d e s  fo rma l  e d u c a t i o n .  W e  a r e  aware t h a t  t h i s  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  may ha= i m p o r t a n t  imp l . i c a t i ons  f o r  wage s t r u c t u r e  
dynamics: High s k i l l  premia  and e a r n i n g s  i n e q u a l i t y  imply  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  i nves tmen t  i n  s k i l l s  a c q u i s i t i o n .  The t r a i n i n g  
i n v e s t m e n t  r e s p o n s e  p l a c e s  demands on  t h e  KS sector. These  added 
demands f o r  KS o u t p u t  imply t h e  augmenta t ion  o f  demand of  s k i l l s  
( s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  used e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e n s i v e l y  t h e r e ) ,  and t h u s  t h e  
wage premium may remain  h igh  i n  s p i t e  o f  r a p i d  s k i l l s  a ccumula t i on .  
F i n a l l y ,  it shou ld  b e  no ted  t h a t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t y  h a s  
a n o t h e r  c o s t  t o  t h e  f i r m  s i n c e  t h e  u n s k i l l e d  u rban  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  
d i m i n i s h e d  by t h e  t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t y .  U n s k i l l e d  " l a b o r  s c a r c i t y "  
may c a u s e  a  s h o r t  r u n  r ise i n  costs as a r e s u l t .  To t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  r u r a l  l a b o r  s u p p l i e s  a r e  e l a s t i c ,  u rban  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  
s c a r c i t y  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  p e r s i s t  f o r  t h e  l o n g e r  r un .  
The model o f  s k i l l s  accumula t ion  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  
one  o f  f i r m s  i n v e s t i n g  i n  v o c a t i o n a l l y - o r i e n t e d  t r a i n i n g  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e i r  p ro f i t -maximiz ing  c a l c u l u s ,  g i v e n  a n  exogenously  
de te rmined  c o s t - o f - t r a i n i n g  f u n c t i o n .  While o u r  model does  n o t  
e x p l a i n  t h e  cost f u n c t i o n ,  changes  i n  it c a n  n o t a b l y  i n f l u e n c e  
the rate of skills accumulation. These changes will derive 
primarily from government education policies which, while 
implicit in our exposition, can now be elaborated. 
The formal education system is not explicitly modeled in our 
economy. Education is produced within the KS sector, together 
with many other government and private services. However, such an 
aggregation does not preclude an examination of the impact of 
government education policies whiih can be represented in our 
model by altering the cost-of-training function. Two such 
policies are illustrated in Figure 3. 
For simplicity, consider the case where the share of 
education in the government's budget is constant, and two 
alternative po1ici.e~ are evaluated. The first policy represents 
a reorientation of the curriculum for the k = 1 education class 
toward more vocational training. This will reduce the training 
costs facing the firm from cl to ci and, for a given demand 
A (say rl), result in an expansion in skills investment by m ' .  
The second policy represents a reallocation of the education 
budget toward producing more k = 1 students at the expense of 
k = 2 students. This will expand the numbers in the k = 1 
education class to AD. If the firms' aggregate demand for skills 
A 
were represented by r2, the new education policy would increase 
the number of skilled laborers by m'. These two examples 
illustrate well the analytical as well as the policy-related 
features of our skills-generation framework. We do not, as is 
common in development modeling, view education as solely a 
consumer durable. Rather, educational outputs can play a 
productive role in the economy; human capital accumulation is 
important in explaining the process of growth and development. 
The specific way education enters is complex, and in our model 
determined by the interplay of production possibilities, 
demographic forces, and government education policies. 
2.8 Housing, Land Markets and Equilibrium Land Use 
There are two competing uses to which land stocks can be put 
in our model - farming and urban residential land sites. We shall 
assume that urban residential sites implicitly include in fixed 
proportion factor-site requirements as well as public land (parks, 
roads, schools). The fixed proportion assumption will simplify 
the analysis considerably, since we can focus exclusively on the 
residential site demand component of urban land use. Furthermore, 
we shall assume that "wasteland" exists in the rural area. This 
wasteland has no competing use, has no inherent site value, but 
it can be used for rural housing construction. In the real 
world, of course, wasteland can be and is exploited for both 
urban and farm land expansion through drainage, clearing and 
filling. These activities involve investment, and to confront 
land accumulation endogenously would require the explicit 
introduction of urban and rural land supply functions, presumably 
inelastic to capture investment costs, and competitive with other 
investments in housing, training and physical accumulation. We 
ignore such complications and take the expansion of productive 
land, R, as exogenously given although not necessarily constant. 
To do otherwise would take us far afield and empirical implementa- 
tion would be much too demanding. 
The stock of productive land in our model is therefore 
defined as 
where urban land sites are utilized for two types of housing - 
low-cost "squatter settlements" (Rutus ) and high-cost "luxury 
housing" ( R ~  , KS 1 
The urban housing market is central to migration behavior 
and thus to our analysis of the urbanization process. One of the 
limits on urban growth rates in the Third World is the availability 
(and cost) of urban housing facing new urban households, whether 
the housing is of the informal, labor-intensive, owner-occupier 
type in "squatter settlements" - so typical of rapidly expanding 
Third World cities, or more substantial dwelling units constructed 
by capital-intensive techniques and rented in a formal housing 
market. Any serious model of urbanization must admit this possible 
source of "limits to urban growth". The "limits" may take various 
forms, but we shall focus on two constraints in particular. 
First, urban rents may rise in the long run due to the inflation 
of urban site rents as in classical urban location theory (Mills, 
1972; Henderson, 1977). In addition, urban rents may also rise 
in the short run if investment in new structures lags behind 
demands generated by rapid urban population growth (Song and 
Struyk, 1976; Mills and Song, 1977). Second, to the extent that 
investment in housing responds to those demands generated by the 
inmigration, aggregate saving available for "productive" accumula- 
tion or training will contract and thus the rate of output 
expansion will suffer economy-wide (Coale and Hoover, 1958). 
Since physical capital and skills are used most intensively in 
the modern sectors (M and KS), the rate of urban labor absorp- 
tion is diminished. Inmigration to the cities and urbanization 
rates may slack off as a result. Our model incorporates these 
forces so that "over-urbanization" (Hoselitz, 1955, 1957; Sovani, 
1962; Kamerschen, 1969; Preston, 1979; Ledent and Rogers, 1979) 
in our economy may be forestalled. 
As pointed out above, there are two housing types in our 
model: low-cost "squatter settlements" and high-cost "luxury 
housing". In this we follow the United Nations' Habitat (1976, 
pp. 70) where they state 
In many less developed countries building is charac- 
terized by the existence of two sectors: a) a multi- 
tude of very small enterprises ... which operate in 
the rural and peri-urban areas, belonging almost 
entirely to the informal sector of the economy; b) a 
small number of large firms using modern techniques 
and organization, 
and their SZobaZ R e v i e w  of Human SettZements (UNI 19761 PP-11) 
where "squatter settlements" 
...g enerally refer to areas where groups of housing 
units have been constructed on land to which the 
occupants have no legal claim. In many instances 
housing units located in squatter settlements are 
shelters or structures built of waste materials 
without a predetermined plan. Squatter settlements 
are usually found...at the peripheries of the princi- 
ple cities. 
According to the same source, these squatter settlements are by 
no means a small share of total urban dwellings, but rather 
account for the bulk of the growth in"cities throughout the Third 
World. (For an excellent survey, see also Mohan, 1979, chp.1.) 
It seems to us important to distinquish these two types of urban 
dwellings, the different sectors that produce them as well as 
the different socio-economic classes that consume the rental 
services that flow from these residential structures. Thus, the 
quality of housing is denoted by a jth subscript in the production 
functions which follow. 
Urban housing services are produced under constant returns 
to scale with housing structures, H and land RU j ,jt as inputs. 
While estimates of the elasticity of substitution between land 
and structures in residential housing production functions vary 
considerably (Muth, 1969, 1971; Arnott and Lewis, 1977; Ingram, 
1977; Henderson, 1977), the estimates are almost always quite 
high. We shall adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification for urban 
housing in what follows: 
where a! 
+ a ~ t  j = 1 , US denotes "squatter settlements", and HI j 
KS "luxury housing". In contrast, rural housing services do not 
require the input of land of significant site value, so that a 
fixed coefficient production function is assumed to apply: 
T h i s  r u r a l - u r b a n  assymmetric t r e a t m e n t  o f  hous ing  i n s u r e s  
t h a t  r i s i n g  l a n d  p r i c e s  and i n c r e a s e d  s i t e  r e n t s  w i l l  have a  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  e f f e c t  on c o s t - o f - l i v i n g  i n  u r b a n  a r e a s  a s  
u r b a n i z a t i o n  p r o c e e d s .  Pe rhaps  t h i s  c a n  b e  s e e n  more c l e a r l y  
when t h e  t o t a l  r e n t a l  p r i c e  f o r  u r b a n  hous ing  i s  w r i t t e n  
e x p l i c i t l y  a s  
where d U  i s  t h e  s i t e  r e n t  and r i s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  r e n t .  Of 
H , j  
c o u r s e ,  t h e  r e a l  e s t a t e  m a r k e t  n e v e r  decomposes t o t a l  r e n t a l  
p r i c e  i n t o  t h e s e  t w o  component s a r t s ,  and i n  o u r  model a l l  d w e l l -  
i n g s  a r e  owner-occupied.  ( I n  Korea ,  f o r  example,  94 p e r c e n t  o f  
r u r a l  and 8 3  p e r c e n t  o f  u r b a n  househo lds  w e r e  owner -occup ie r s  i n  
1975. Suh, 1979,  t a b l e  11 ,  pp.47.)  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it w i l l  s t i l l  
prove  a n a l y t i c a l l y  u s e f u l  to  decompose t o t a l  r e n t a l  p r i c e s  i n  
t h i s  f a s h i o n .  I n  p e r c e n t a q e  r a t e s  of  change ( d e n o t e d  by a n  " * " ) ,  
t h e s e  r e n t a l  p r i c e s  a r e  r e l a t e d  by 
L a n d ' s  s h a r e ,  a 
R,  j , h a s  been e s t i m a t e d  t o  b e  a b o u t  0.10 
(Muth, 1971. See  a l s o  Muth, 1969; Henderson,  1977; and Ingram, 
1977. )  It  f o l l o w s  t h a t  modest  i n c r e a s e s  i n  u r b a n  r e n t a l  p r i c e s  
may be  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  d r a m a t i c  i n c r e a s e s  i n  u r b a n  s i t e  r e n t s  
( c a l l e d  t h e  " m a g n i f i c a t i o n  e f f e c t "  i n  t h e  u r b a n  l i t e r a t u r e ) .  
Dramat ic  i n c r e a s e s  i n  u r b a n  s i t e  r e n t s  imply  e q u a l l y  d r a m a t i c  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  u r b a n  l a n d  p r i c e s  and t h e  l a t t e r  have become a  
n o t a b l e  f e a t u r e  of  2 0 t h  c e n t u r y  development  even  i n  t h e  T h i r d  
World. For  example,  Korean u r b a n  l a n d  p r i c e s  have been r i s i n g  i n  
r e a l  terms a t  16 p e r c e n t  p e r  annum s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  1960s .  ( M i l l s  
and Song, 1977. On t h e  boom i n  T h i r d  World u r b a n  l a n d  v a l u e s ,  
see Woodruff and  Brown, 1971, pp .  16-25, c h p s .  5 , 6 ,  and 9 .  The 
same phenomenon can be found in postwar Japan, documented in 
Mills and Ohta, 1976.) 
What, then, determines land rents, land prices and land use 
in our model? 
The agricultural production function is Cobb-Douglas. Under 
competitive assumptions, land rents per hectare can therefore be 
written as 
Alternatively, expression (45) can be written as a derived demand 
function for farm land: 
where the derived demand function has an elasticity of -1. 
Similarly, the urban housing Cobb-Douglas production functions 
imply derived urban land demands for residential purposes 
(recalling that "residential" requirements embody commercial, 
factory, and public site needs). Thus, 
is the net rent received by the owner (imputed, not where PH j 
cash) after paying an urban property tax. Since it is not our 
purpose here to determine the distribution of urban populations 
across urban space - as in classic urban location theory - nor 
to confront the Third World reality that "squatter settlements" 
tend to locate at the fringe of the city while "luxury housing" 
tends to locate nearer the central business district (Mohan, 1977; 
Ingram and Carroll, 1978; Mills and Song, 19771, we shall assume 
that urban site rents are the same for all urban households. 
Thus, 
L ike  fa rmland ,  t h e s e  d e r i v e d  demand f u n c t i o n s  f o r  u rban  l and  a l s o  
have  a n  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  -1. The aggregate d e r i v e d  demand f u n c t i o n  
f o r  urban l a n d  i s  s imp ly  
Our model i s  i n  no way a t r u e  s p a t i a l  framework s i n c e  
d i s t a n c e  p l a y s  no r o l e  i n  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  two s e c t o r s .  Thus, farm 
g a t e  p r i c e s  do n o t  r ise  w i t h  g r e a t e r  p rox imi ty  t o  u rban  marke t s  
and t h e r e f o r e  farm l a n d  d o e s  n o t  e x h i b i t  a  " r e n t a l  g r a d i e n t "  
r e f l e c t i n g  such  h e t e r o g e n e i t y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  p rox imi ty  t o  t h e  
c e n t r a l  b u s i n e s s  d i s t r i c t  d o e s  n o t  o f f e r  any o f  t h e  advan t ages  
t y p i c a l l y  p o s t u l a t e d  i n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  u rban  l o c a t i o n  t h e o r y  ( s a v i n g s  
i n  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s  and commuter t i m e ! .  There  i s  t h e r e f o r e  no 
u rban  " r e n t a l  g r a d i e n t "  imp l i ed .  S i n c e  u rban  l a n d  i s  homogenous 
i n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  o n l y  t h e  " e x t r a m a r g i n a l "  r e n t  a t  t h e  f r i n g e  o f  t h e  
c i t y  m a t t e r s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  l a n d  u se .  
F i g u r e  4 s u p p l i e s  t h e  o p t i m a l  l and  u s e  s o l u t i o n  under  such  
* 
c o n d i t i o n s .  The e q u i l i b r i u m  r e n t  i s  deno t ed  by d = dU = dA,  and 
t h e  o p t i m a l  l a n d  u s e  mix i s  d e r i v e d  a c c o r d i n g l y .  What seems 
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  u s  i s  how many c e n t r a l  l a n d  u s e  i s s u e s  a r e  c a p t u r e d  
by t h i s  s imp le  framework. Three  such  i s s u e s  a r e  c o n f r o n t e d  i n  
what  f o l l ows :  Does t h e  model p r e d i c t  r i s i n g  u rban  d e n s i t i e s  o v e r  
t ime?  Can it accoun t  f o r  t h e  d r a m a t i c  r ise i n  u rban  l a n d  v a l u e s ?  
W i l l  it produce an  encroachment on farmland o v e r  t ime?  

I t  i s  common theorem of growth theo ry  t h a t  f a c t o r s  i n  
r e l a t i v e  i n e l a s t i c  supply  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e l a t i v e  r e n t  (and 
t h u s  p r i c e  o r  v a l u e )  u n l e s s  technology t e n d s  t o  be ve ry  f a c t o r -  
s av ing  of  t h e  i n e l a s t i c a l l y - s u p p l i e d  i n p u t  ( e . g . ,  Nichols ,  1 9 7 0 ) .  
I n  o u r  model, c a p i t a l  accumulates ,  s k i l l s  a r e  augmented th rough  
t r a i n i n g ,  p o p u l a t i o n  growth s w e l l s  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  (and t h u s  
r e s i d e n t i a l  housing s t o c k s ) ,  b u t  t h e  s t o c k  of l and  grows 
exogenously,  and presumably a t  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  r a t e s .  The 
presumption i s  t h a t  r e l a t i v e  r e n t s  w i l l  r i s e  ove r  t i m e  u n l e s s  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change s e r v e s  t o  s a v e  on l a n d .  I f  one f o c u s e s  o n l y  
on l and  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  u s e s ,  " t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change" s u r e l y  
does  t end  t o  s a v e  on l and  s i n c e  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  d e c l i n e s  
i n  r e l a t i v e  s i z e  w i t h  s u c c e s s f u l  economic growth. On t h e  o t h e r  
hand, o u r  model e x p l i c i t l y  i n t r o d u c e s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  l and  u s e  - 
urban r e s i d e n t i a l  s i t e  needs  - and s i n c e  s u c c e s s f u l  economic 
growth i m p l i e s  r a p i d  u r b a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e  " land-saving"  a t t r i b u t e s  
of t h e  s i m p l e r  growth model a r e  no l onge r  s o  r e l e v a n t .  Indeed,  
wh i l e  o u r  u rban  housing p roduc t ion  f u n c t i o n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n c l u d e  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of e x t e n s i v e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of s t r u c t u r e s  f o r  l a n d  
( g u a r a n t e e i n g  t h a t  u rban  d e n s i t i e s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  f a c e  of 
r i s i n g  l and  r e n t s ) ,  r a p i d  u r b a n i z a t i o n  i m p l i e s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
vo rac ious  demand f o r  l and  and t h e  encroachment of farm l and  a t  
t h e  c i t i e s '  margin. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  f o r c e s  a t  work i n  
a g r i c u l t u r e  which w i l l  s h i f t  outwards  t h e  d e r i v e d  demand f o r  farm- 
land :  e . g . ,  t h e  r i s i n g  p r i c e  o f  f o o d s t u f f s  and t h e  accumula t ion  
of a g r i c u l t u r a l  c a p i t a l .  I n  s h o r t ,  we e x p e c t  t h e  model t o  produce 
ove r  t ime  a n  outward s h i f t  i n  t h e  d e r i v e d  demand f o r  l and  i n  bo th  
u s e s ,  b u t  w e  a l s o  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  d e r i v e d  demand f o r  urban l a n d  
w i l l  s h i f t  outward a t  a  more r a p i d  r a t e .  
The l ong  run  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  such  d e r i v e d  demand growth can  
be s een  i n  F i g u r e  5,  where t h e  fo l l owing  t r e n d s  should  be 
observed:  ( 1  ) Rents  r i se  a t  a  r a p i d  r a t e ,  u rban  and r u r a l ;  
(2) Land u s e  s h i f t s  i n  f a v o r  of urban r e s i d e n t i a l  u s e ,  b u t  t h e  
r a t e  of  s h i f t  i s  choked o f f  by two f o r c e s . -  t h e  downward s l o p i n g  
c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  d e r i v e d  demand f o r  farmland and t h e  tendency 
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f o r  urban hous ing  t o  consume less space  as l a n d  g e t s  s c a r c e r ;  
( 3 )  Urban l a n d  d e n s i t i e s  rise. A l l  of t h e s e  a t t r i b u t e s  a r e  
" s t y l i z e d  f a c t s "  of u r b a n i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  Th i rd  World.* 
*This  a n a l y s i s  i g n o r e s  p r o p e r t y  and c a p i t a l  g a i n s  t a x e s .  Very 
few Th i rd  World economies u t i l i z e  such  t a x e s ,  b u t  t h e y  may w e l l  
be i n t roduced  i n  t h e  nea r  f u t u r e .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  w e  t hough t  it 
u s e f u l  t o  i n t r o d u c e  such  t a x  pa rame te r s  i n t o  t h e  model t o  a l l o w  
e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  impact .  The v a l u e  o f  u rban  
p r o p e r t y  i s  
o r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
where PH i s  t h e  ( imputed)  r e n t  on t h e  j t h  t y p e  of  housing - a 
1 1 
"demand" p r i c e " ,  P H g i  i s  t h e  ( imputed)  r e n t  n e t  of p r o p e r t y  t a x e s  
. - 
on s i t e  and s t r u c t u r e  - a  "supply  p r i c e " ,  and T~ i s  t h e  u rban  
, j 
p r o p e r t y  t a x  ra te  (most  l i k e l y  z e r o  on " s q u a t t e r  s e t t l e m e n t s l f )  . 
Theref o r e ,  
t h e  - "demand - p r i c e "  f o r  housing exceeding t h e  " supp ly  p r i c e "  by 
Consider next the determinants of urban land values. In 
the simplest formulation, urban land values can be calculated 
assuming naive expectations regarding the behavior of future 
rents (i.e., du is expected to prevail at the current rate 
forever) and assuming infinite life. Thus, 
where i is the economy-wide "discount rate". In the absence of 
inflation, it seems unlikely that i will drift upwards over 
time. This seems unlikely since conventional capital will 
accumulate rapidly over time in the successful LDC, thus lower- 
ing the returns to "machines" unless technology is very capital- 
using (a distinct possibility with the capital-intensive sectors, 
KS and M, growing relatively rapidly). But the percentage rate 
of return, it is related to the returns to machines, r, by 
Thus, while increases in the relative price of urban land should 
be a characteristic of our model, the sources of this increase 
are more complex than simply the expected increases in land rents. 
2.9 Balance of Payments and the Foreign Trade Sector 
Since there are no monetary variables in our model, the 
balance of payments must always be in equilibrium. We assume, 
therefore, that the foreign exchange rate is consistent with 
balance of payments equilibrium such that the external clearing 
equation is satisfied by 
-W where PA XA are export earnings, [FW M + FZ (ZKs + zM + zA)l M M 
a r e  f o r e i g n  exchange requi rements  f o r  impor t s ,  and F deno te s  
exogenous l e v e l s  of n e t  f o r e i g n  a i d  and p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  impor t s .  
Equat ion (55)  h i d e s  more than  it r e v e a l s  and what fo l lows  i s  a n  
e l a b o r a t i o n  of o u r  i m p l i c i t  assumptions r ega rd ing  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p s .  
Our model i s  a  conven t iona l  "ven t  f o r  s u r p l u s "  paradigm. 
-W -W That  i s ,  o u r  economy i s  viewed a s  a  p r i c e  t a k e r  w i t h  PA, p~ and 
PZ a l l  determined i n  world markets.* Given domest ic  demand and 
supply c o n d i t i o n s ,  exces s  s u p p l i e s  of t h e  pr imary produc t  can 
be "vented"  on world markets  and exces s  demands f o r  manufactured 
goods can be s a t i s f i e d  i n  t h e  same f a s h i o n .  I t  should be noted 
t h a t  t h i s  approach f o c u s e s  a t t e n t i o n  e x c l u s i v e l y  on t h e  ~ c t  t r a d e  
of bo th  commodity t ypes .  The model does  n o t  c o n f r o n t  g r o s s  
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i n c l u d i n g  dynamic changes i n  t h e  mix of 
commodity t r a d e  w i t h i n  t h e s e  e x p o r t  and import  c a t e g o r i e s .  Thus, 
wh i l e  t h e  model i s  f u l l y  capab le  of e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  n e t  impact  of 
dynamic comparat ive  advantage,  it cannot  d e a l  w i t h  any tendency 
towards s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  of l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  consumer 
goods i n  exchange f o r  more cap i t a l - cum-sk i l l  i n t e n s i v e  producer  
d u r a b l e s .  I t  does  seem l i k e l y ,  however, t h a t  t h e  observed 
tendency of comparat ive  advantage t o  s h i f t  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  from 
pr imary p roduc t s  t o  manufactured goods w i l l  be cap tu red  by t h e  
model. Th i s  p r o c e s s  of  dynamic comparat ive  advantage can  be s e e n  
i n  t h e  conven t iona l  t r a d e  diagram i n  F i g u r e  6 ,  where Po r e p r e s e n t s  
an i n i t i a l  p roduc t ion  mix ( i . e . ,  QA and Q ) and Co an  i n i t i a l  
M 
domest ic  consumption mix (i. e . ,  DA and Dp,,) . R e l a t i v e l y  r a p i d  
c a p i t a l  and s k i l l  accumulat ion,  compared t o  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r  and 
l and ,  a s  w e l l  a s  unbalanced t o t a l  f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth 
f a v o r i n g  manufactur ing,  i s  l i k e l y  t o  s h i f t  t h e  p roduc t ion  
p o s s i b i l i t y  f r o n t i e r  i n  a f a s h i o n  such t h a t  ( a t  C,  and P I )  n e t  
dependence on e x p o r t s  of  pr imary p roduc t s  w i l l  d imin i sh  u n l e s s  
domest ic  demand c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  h i g h l y  b i a sed  towards  manufactured 
goods. Indeed,  t h e  model may w e l l  y i e l d  a  s h i f t  i n  comparat ive  
advantage t o  a n e t  e x p o r t  of manufactured goods,  a l t hough  F i g u r e  6 
does  n o t  e l a b o r a t e  on t h i s  c a s e .  
*We invoke t h e  "law of  one p r i c e "  here .  See ,  however, I s a r d ,  
1976; Krav is  and Lipsey ,  1977; and Dervis  and Robinson, 1978. 

These trade conditions can be influenced by tariffs, T ~ , ~ ,  
and export taxes, T T,X' They can also be influenced by the 
many tax parameters which comprise domestic tax policy, including 
all of those governmental influences that affect the mix of 
demand. Commercial policy would normally take the form of raising 
the price of manufactured goods relative to agricultural goods 
in domestic markets; that is, the price line in Figure 6 would be 
rotated counterclockwise. A relative expansion in the production 
of manufactured goods would take place, say at P2. The now cheaper 
relative price of agricultural goods would foster a relative 
increase in the domestic consumption of agricultural goods, say 
at C2. Of course world market prices would still prevail. Tariffs 
and export taxes serve, therefore, to distort the price between 
domestic and international markets as well as to generate govern- 
ment revenues. 
Net foreign capital inflows, F, are given exogenously. This 
treatment of "foreign aid" may appear at first sight to be in the 
tradition of the "two gap" literature (Chenery and Strout, 1966), 
but it actually conforms more readily with the revisionist 
literature which has developed in recent years (Griffen and Enos, 
1970; Weisskopf, 1972; Papanek, 1973; Heller, 1975; Bhagwati and 
Grinols, 1975; Grinols and Bhagwati, 1976). That literature has 
pointed out that domestic saving appears to bear a negative 
correlation with foreign aid levels, implying that the domestic 
savings effort is relaxed with the addition of foreign aid. 
Presumably, the "relaxation" of the domestic saving effort lies 
primarily with the government sector where, it is thought, the 
tax effort is diminished and current expenditures are expanded 
at the expense of government saving. As we shall see in the next 
section, our model does indeed capture such behavioral responses. 
On the other hand, since the rate of return plays no direct role 
as an influence on domestic savings in our model, the possibility 
that F may "crowd out" private savings (McKinnon, 1973) is ignored. 
Our own view is not that "crowding out" forces are irrelevant, 
but rather that development economists have not yet successfully 
accounted for their quantitative influence (see, however, Heller, 
1975; Ortrneyer, 1979). 
2 . 1 0  The Government S e c t o r  
The government has  two sou rces  of revenue i n  o u r  model: 
endogenously determined t a x e s  and exogenous l e v e l s  o f  n e t  f o r e i g n  
" a i d "  and p r i v a t e  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l ,  t h e  l a t t e r  assumed t o  f low 
through government channe l s .  These revenues  form t h e  t o t a l  
government budget  c o n s t r a i n t  which i s  a l l o c a t e d  between sav ing  
( l a r g e l y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t s ,  r o a d s ,  s c h o o l s ,  
and p u b l i c  b u i l d i n g s ) ,  b u t  a l s o  i n c l u d i n g  c u r r e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  
educa t ion  and consumption ( l a r g e l y  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on  de fense  and 
s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s ) .  With t h e  excep t ion  of c u r r e n t  educa t ion  
expend i tu re s  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c o u n t e r p a r t  of  t h e s e  two spending 
c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  t h e  government ' s  c a p i t a l  and c u r r e n t  budge ts ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The i n c l u s i o n  of e d u c a t i o n  expend i tu re  i n  government " sav ing"  
r e p r e s e n t s  a break  w i t h  t h e  conven t iona l  t r e a t m e n t  of government 
i n  most growth and development models. T y p i c a l l y ,  t h e  government 
i s  modeled s o  t h a t  i t s  consumption does  n o t  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  household income o r  u t i l i t y ,  nor  does  it c o n t r i b u t e  t o  f u t u r e  
o u t p u t  expansion.  While t h i s  i s  a u s e f u l  a b s t r a c t i o n  f o r  some 
purposes ,  e s p e c i a l l y  g i v e n  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  v a l u i n g  and a l l o c a t -  
i n g  p u b l i c  goods t o  consuming u n i t s ,  it w i l l  n o t  s u f f i c e  i n  o u r  
model. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  e d u c a t i o n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  may w e l l  y i e l d  consump- 
t i o n  u t i l i t y  t o  i t s  r e c i p i e n t s ,  b u t  i n  o u r  model t hey  have a n  impact  
on f u t u r e  income a s  w e l l .  Th i s  r e a l i t y  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  i n c o r p o r a t e d  
i n  o u r  model s i n c e  s k i l l s  a r e  produced by t r a i n i n g  inves tment  
and t h e s e  compete w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  modes of accumulat ion.  I t  
seems a p p r o p r i a t e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  i n c l u d e  t h i s  ca t ego ry  of 
government e x p e n d i t u r e  a s  sav ing .  While o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  
government expend i tu re  might  a l s o  s o  q u a l i f y  ( e . g . ,  h e a l t h  
e x p e n d i t u r e s ) ,  o u r  approach can be  cons ide red  a t  l e a s t  a  p a r t i a l  
r e c t i f i c a t i o n  of an  an t i -g rowth  b i a s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  government 
i n  most development models. 
A l l  government f i n a l  demands a r e  produced by t h e  c a p i t a l -  
cum-ski l l  i n t e n s i v e  ( K S )  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r ,  and government demand 
dominates  t h i s  s e c t o r ' s  t o t a l  o u t p u t .  We make no d i s t i n c t i o n  
between governmental  and p r i v a t e l y  owned and ope ra t ed  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  
focusing instead on the demand characteristics of government 
activities. 
Taxes come from a wide range of sources. These include: 
1. taxes on households' consumption of M sector 
goods , 
2. taxes (or subsidies) on agricultural intermediate 
inputs purchased from manufacturing, 
- - 
3. taxes on urban property (including housing), 
I- 1 r 1 
4. taxes on enterprise income (net of depreciation 
allowances) in the M and KS sectors, 
5. taxes on distributed profits, 
6. taxes on rental income in agriculture, 
7. taxes on skilled labor's income, 
r - 
8. and taxes on foreign trade, 
For the most part the tax specification is straight 
forward, but tariffs and export taxes could pose some technical 
difficulties. Treating import tariffs and export subsidies as 
ad vaZorem rates, the tax revenue is T T,. ['z 'MI + 'T,; ['A 'A]. 
As we pointed out in the previous section, however, our model 
examines n e t  imports of manufactured goods (MM) and r.et exports 
of primary products (XA), a feature common to this type of model 
where the composition of imports and exports is suppressed. Since 
the composition of imports and exports shifts systerratically as 
economic development takes place, and since n e t  imports of 
manufactured goods decline through import substitution (with 
perhaps the country even becoming a net exporter of this commod- 
ity),a tax function based on n e t  trade flows could yield inappro- 
priate estimates of revenues derived from international trade. 
In fact, however, this is unlikely to be a problem with our 
"representative country" which, over a period of twenty to 
forty years, remains on average a net importer of manufactured 
goods and a net exporter of agricultural commodities. 
The government tax revenue function can now be summarized 
in equation (56): 
This tax function exhibits an urban bias, a feature documented 
in surveys of fiscal finance in low income countries. Only labor 
income of the relatively high-paid urban skilled worker is taxed; 
in addition, the income of capitalists and landlords, who are 
assumed to be largely located in cities, is also subject to income 
taxes. While in some countries lower income workers have been 
t axed ,  t h e  y i e l d  has  t y p i c a l l y  been smal l  due t o  low t a x  r a t e s ,  
t a x  evasion,  and h igh  c o s t s  of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  This  form of 
t a x a t i o n  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  omi t ted  from our  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  The 
urban b i a s  i s  a l s o  e v i d e n t  g iven  our  t r ea tmen t  of commodity 
t a x a t i o n  of manufactured goods, a s  we l l  a s  t h e  t a x  on urban 
r e s i d e n t i a l  p rope r ty .  
Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  t a x  f u n c t i o n  is i t s  apparen t  
high e l a s t i c i t y  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  GNP and t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  of 
s t r u c t u r a l  change t h a t  accompany economic growth: an  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  s h a r e  of manufactured goods i n  t o t a l  household expend i tu res ,  
a  r i s i n g  s h a r e  of modern s e c t o r  o u t p u t ,  a  s h i f t  of t h e  l a b o r  
f o r c e  i n t o  h ighe r  s k i l l e d  occupat ions ,  and an i n c r e a s i n g  
i n e q u a l i t y  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of income i n  t h e  e a r l y  t o  
in t e rmed ia t e  s t a g e s  of economic development. A r i s i n g  s h a r e  of 
t a x e s  and government spending i n  GNP i s  a  l i k e l y  outcome from 
our  model, and such p a t t e r n s  would conform t o  empi r i ca l  r e s u l t s  
ob ta ined  i n  s e v e r a l  s t u d i e s  (Bi rd ,  1976; Bolnick,  1978; C h e l l i a h ,  
1971; Che l l i ah ,  Bass, and Kel ly ,  1975) .  
One q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t a x  f u n c t i o n  i s  i n  o rde r .  While 
t h e  p r o f i t s  of t h e  KS s e c t o r  a r e  taxed ,  a  major p o r t i o n  of t h i s  
s e c t o r  produces government goods and s e r v i c e s .  This  i s  a  nixed 
pub l i c -p r iva te  s e c t o r ,  a  r e a l i t y  cap tu red  i n  t h e  model by 
s p e c i f y i n g  lower "co rpora t e"  t a x  and payout r a t e s  i n  t h e  KS than  
i n  t h e  M s e c t o r ,  i . e . ,  r IIIKS < r I I I M  and YKS < YM. 
Unlike most g e n e r a l  equ i l ib r ium models ( b u t  s e e  H e l l e r ,  1975) , 
government spending i s  n o t  exogenously g iven  i n  our  model. Such 
an hypothes is  would n o t  on ly  be a t  v a r i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  
l i t e r a t u r e  (Gandhi, 1971; Kel ley,  1973, 1976a; Thorn, 1967) ,  b u t  
i s  a l s o  unappealing f o r  a  model t h a t  accounts  f o r  t h e  sources  of 
growth and s t r u c t u r a l  change i n  t h e  long run.  The p r e s e n t  model 
a t t e m p t s ,  a l b e i t  i n  a  h igh ly  s i m p l i f i e d  f a s h i o n ,  t o  c a p t u r e  
a s p e c t s  of government spending over  t ime by appea l ing  t o  much t h e  
same f o r c e s  t h a t  determine p r i v a t e  consumption and saving 
behavior .  The government i s  assumed t o  a l l o c a t e  i t s  budget t o  
sav ing ,  G~ i n  response t o  increments i n  t h e  r e sources  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  it from t a x e s  and f o r e i g n  sources ,  and i n  response t o  demo- 
g raph ic  and urban pressures- -  by assumption t h e  main source  of 
-66- 
public investment demands. Thus, 
eS = a  G + BG [T + PI + YG [NU(-i)l 
We anticipated that government's marginal propensity to save, 
BG would exceed that of the private sector, based on the litera- 
ture accumulated to date on this issue (Mikesell and Zinser, 1973; 
Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976; Williamson, 1979). We also 
expected, contrary to the Coale and Hoover (1958) hypothesis, 
that public saving would be positively related to increasing 
urban populations, yG > 0. Some analysts, like Michael Lipton 
(1976), would view this prediction as an accurate reflection of 
the realities of the "urban bias in world development." A pooled 
sample of "representative" Third World economies covering the 
1960's and early 1970's confirms both expectations. Indeed, 
A 
BG and TG are estimated as .334 (9.19) and .484(4.06), respectively 
(t-statistics in parentheses). This result is not conditional on 
our definition of saving since similar results are forthcoming 
when expenditures on education are excluded from government saving, 
A A 
although both BG and yG are somewhat lower when GS is defined to 
exclude educational expenditures. 
Finally, note that since iG < 1, changes in levels of foreign 
aid do not augment the domestic saving pool by an equal amount, 
but rather by only BG - dP. This places us squarely in the 
"revisionist" foreign aid camp discussed in Section 2.9. 
2.11 Household Demand, Saving, and Migrant Remittances 
One of the ironies of the development planning literature 
is the relative paucity of investigations of the role of demand 
in the process of growth and structural change. By this we mean 
that there are few models that admit prices as an influence on 
demand, and that simultaneously permit demand to influence prices.* 
While the incorporation of Engel effects provides a first approxi- 
mation, such demand influences do not adequately capture the 
systematic influence of prices as development takes place. We 
agree with Lluch, Powell, and Williams (1977) who note: 
... the bulk of models of economic development have 
been based on the assumption that commodity prices 
are of little or no significance in determining the 
crucial aspects of economic behavior. The oil crises 
may or may not constitute a convincing rebuttal of 
this proposition, but investigation of the role of 
prices remains high on the list of priorities in 
economic development modeling. Prices cannot be 
investigated meaningfully without also examining the 
structure of demand. (pp. xxii.) 
To explore the issues surrounding the role of demand in 
economic development, we have selected the Extended Linear 
Expenditure System (ELES), recently elaborated and empirically 
investigated by Lluch, Powell, and Williams (1977). The ELES 
framework captures most of the stylized demand facts associated 
with modern economic growth in the Third World. In particular 
it, 
1. captures Engel effects; 
2. incorporates dualistic elements in demand 
behavior across regions and socioeconomic 
class; 
3. provides an important role for demographic 
influences; 
4. and offers explicit empirical content to the 
concept of "subsistence" in the low-income 
societies. 
Equally important, the framework can be derived from reasonable 
postulates of utility behavior (Goldberger, 1967; Brown and 
Deaton, 1972; Howe, 1975) and satisfies the "adding up" property 
*This is becoming less true with the recent proliferation of 
computable general equilibrium models, primarily produced by 
World Bank economists and consultants. See, for example, Lysy 
and Taylor, 1977; Blitzer, Clark, and Taylor, 1975; and the 
recent large-scale model by Adelman and ~obinson, 1978. It 
still remains true of economic-demographic models. 
common to several modern integrated demand systems. Its only 
serious competitor is the direct addilog system first developed 
by Frisch (1959) and extended by Houthakker (1960) and Sato 
(1972). The ELES has the advantage, however, of having been 
estimated with data for Third World economies underlying our 
"representative economy" model. 
In its simplest,form, the extended linear expenditure system 
assumes that the household allocates its disposable income (y*) 
between various commodities (ql,.,qn) and savings where prices 
(PI ...,pn) are exogenous to the household, and saving is the 
difference between total income and the sum of all commodity 
expenditures (y* - c, where c = 1 piqi = 1 vi). The model further 
assumes that the household's utility function is such that each 
commodity potentially possesses a "minimum subsistence demand" 
(yi -> 0) which must be fulfilled before the remaining "super- 
numerary" income (y* - 1 piyi) is allocated at the margin between 
the various commodities and saving. This paradigm of household 
saving and spending is represented by the expenditure equations 
A graphical presentation of the ELES for the two-commodity 
case is provided in Figure 7. Based on utility function u(ql,q2), 
and assuming qi > yi, the household's expenditure and savings 
allocations follow directly: for ql, yl represents subsistence 
needs, B - yl is supernumerary expenditure on this commodity, 
and saving is measured by the value of ql not consumed, S/pl. 
Figure 7. The two-commodity case of ELES. 
An analagous accounting holds for q2. Such a representation 
highlights the role of prices in saving-expenditure allocation 
decisions, a feature captured in our general equilibrium model 
which utilizes the ELES. By rotating the three parallel lines, 
alternative prices would prevail; these would elicit quite 
different allocations between qi and s. 
The ELES is similar to the more familiar Linear Expenditure 
System (LES), with one notable difference: in the extended system, 
total consumption out of disposable income is determined endogen- 
ously. Thus, the sum of the marginal budget shares and savings 
exhausts disposable income. In the LES, the sum of the marginal 
budget shares exhausts total expenditure.* The ELES thus does 
not utilize the strong separability assumption between saving 
and expenditure embedded in the LES, but rather views the house- 
hold as determining its expenditure allocation simultaneously 
with its total consumption decision, an appealing premise. 
The ELES implies a Keynesian saving specification except 
that supernumerary disposable income is the determinant of house- 
hold saving, not disposable income. While a savings specification 
which took account of rates of return and asset portfolio 
preferences would be desirable, it is too complex to incorporate 
into this version of our basic model and in any case debate still 
continues over the appropriate empirical characterization of 
interest elasticities in household saving functions. Yet, our 
savings specification does respond to the appeal by Mikesell and 
Zinser (1973) who, in their survey of the literature for develop- 
ing countries, urge the exploration of savings behavior of 
various types of households. Compositional influences will be 
captured in our framework to the extent that there may be a shift 
in the distribution of income to higher-saving households as 
economic development takes place. 
Our savings specification also permits commodity prices to 
influence saving. Based on ELES estimates of saving and expen- 
diture allocation for seventeen countries, Lluch,   ow ell, and 
Williams (1977) found that for low ranges of per capita income, 
a one percent rise in the price of food will elicit a 1.8 percent 
decline in the saving rate (pp. xxv). If this quantitative 
*The LES is therefore a subset of the ELES, where saving is 
determined exogenously. To see this, sum the expenditure equa- 
tions in (61) to obtain c = (1 - u )  lpiyi + py*, where p = l ~ ~ .  
By obtaining an expression for y* in terms of c, and substituting 
into (61), the more familiar LES results, 
A 
V i = PiYi + Bi (C - [piyi) , where ^Bi = Bi/p 
result has general validity, then omitting prices from the 
saving decision, as would be implied by household systems based 
on the strong separability assumption, may provide quite 
misleading results concerning the role of demand in economic 
development . 
The treatment of "subsistence" consumption is a particularly 
interesting feature of the ELES. The concept has many inter- 
pretations in the economic development literature, ranging from 
the "biological-requirements-for-survival" notion in early 
dualistic models (Jorgenson, 1967), to the recent policy discus- 
sions relating to "basic needs", a set of socially desired 
minimum consumption standards (Srinivasan, 1977; Streeten and 
Burki, 1978; Hopkins and Norbye, 1978). The ELES demand system 
provides an interpretation of subsistence which lies between 
these two extremes. In particular, the yils are determined by 
the house~oldls own preferences and thus represent an aggregation 
of biological requirements, individual preferences, and social 
norms. The composition of the yils, as well as their aggregate 
size, may vary across individuals in society. While our model 
will treat the yils as parameters constant to a household type, 
subsistence demand may change over time, in part due to shifts 
in the distribution of income across households. The yils have 
particular relevance, therefore, to interpreting the consequences 
of specific types of income-expenditure distribution policies in 
the low-income country. 
Recent empirical investigations of the ELES utilizing micro 
economic data from Mexico, Korea, Chile, ~ugoslavia, and several 
Latin American cities (Lluch, Powell, and Williams, 1977) has 
established differences in household demand behavior related to 
selected demographic characteristics, location (largely urban 
and rural), and socioeconomic class, even after controlling for 
the level of household income. Based on this and similar 
findings (Kelley and Williamson, 1968; Kelley, 1969, 1976b; Blitzer, 
Clark, and Taylor, 1975; Betancourt, 1979), we have elected to 
disaggregate our households into several categories: urban and 
rural, on the one hand; and skilled labor, unskilled labor, and 
property income recipients on the other. This will permit the 
investigation of the role of demand through systematic changes 
in the composition of households as development takes place, and 
in particular, the impact of urbanization, changing income 
distribution, and skill accumulation. The possibility that we 
will be able to assess the role of household final demand effects, 
adjusted to indirect derived demands originating through the 
interindustry structure, represents an interesting feature of the 
model. We should be able to provide at least one empirically 
relevant test of the competing hypothesis concerning the relative 
importance of demand variations, versus supply changes operating 
through technical change and resource availabilities, on the 
patterns and rates of economic change. (See Chenery, 1960; Kuznets, 
1957, 1966; Clark, 1957; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975.) 
A full statement of the household demand system, as well as 
statements summarizing their aggregation into final demand cate- 
gories corresponding to our model's production structure, is 
provided in Appendix A as equations (59) - (62) . Each household Is 
demand statement, irrespective of location or socioeconomic class, 
possesses the form presented above in equation (59). In addition 
Appendix A provides a side equation (60) for the cost of living 
relevant to various types of households. This statistic will be 
important in assessing the impact of economic policies on various 
aspects of household welfare, especially those policies relating 
to income distribution and migration. 
Finally, it should be noted that incomes (except for 
property income recipients) are adjusted to take into account 
the intersectoral flow of migrants' remittances, TRF. (See 
equation (61).) These transfers are generally believed to be 
large, and Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) have confirmed that 
belief, at least on Kenyan data. Based on these results, we 
s p e c i f y  t h e  t r a n s f e r s  t o  r u r a l  households t o  be  a f i x e d  s h a r e  
of income, T : 
That  s h a r e  i s  almost s u r e l y  a  f u n c t i o n  of l e n g t h  of  t i m e  s i n c e  
t h e  r e m i t t i n g  household migrated t o  t h e  c i t y ,  b u t  w e  have had no 
succes s  i n  s e c u r i n g  estimates on such parameters .  I n  any case, 
t h e s e  t r a n s f e r s  p l a y  a p o t e n t i a l l y  impor tan t  r o l e  i n  o u r  model 
i n  t w o  ways: f i r s t ,  t h e y  have w e l f a r e  i m p l i c a t i o n s ;  second,  t hey  
may have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  p r i v a t e  consump- 
t i o n  demand, s av ing  and inves tment  a l l o c a t i o n .  
2 . 1 2  Housing Inves tment  and Aggregate Saving 
Aggregate sav ing  de t e rmines  accumulat ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i n  
ou r  model, and t h i s  s a v i n g s  pool  is gene ra t ed  by t h r e e  sou rces :  
r e t a i n e d  a f t e r - t a x  c o r p o r a t e  and e n t e r p r i s e  p r o f i t s ,  government 
s av ing ,  and household sav ing .  (Fore ign  sav ing  s e r v e s  t o  augment 
government r e s o u r c e s  and t h u s  i n d i r e c t l y  appea r s  as a component 
of government s av ing . )  These t h r e e  sou rces  can be w r i t t e n  a s  
where a l l  parameters  and v a r i a b l e s  have been p r e v i o u s l y  d e f i n e d .  
There are three competing demands on this savings pool: invest- 
ment in physical ("productive") capital, investment in human 
capital (training), and investment in ("unproductive") housing. 
Following the conventional emphasis in the development literature, 
physical capital accumulation is written as a residual in equation 
'M1n = SAVINGS - HOUSING - TRAINING COSTS, ( 9 7  
but it should be emphasized that these three modes of accumulation 
are determined simultaneously and in competition. Investment 
allocation rules dictating the intersectoral allocation of PMIM 
between agriculture, manufacturing and the KS sector were 
discussed in Section 2.6; the determinants of training investment 
levels were described in Section 2.7. This section will focus on 
housing investment demand under imperfect capital markets. It will 
then conclude with a summary of the mechanism which dictates over- 
all investment allocation in the model. 
Following Coale and Hoover (1958), our model distinguishes 
between "productive" and "unproductive" investment. Unproductive 
investment is captured by housing requirements, a component which 
is sensitive to demographic and urbanization forces. Furthermore, 
housing investment is viewed in much the same way that subsistence 
consumption requirements are treated in the consumer demand 
system. That is, private households behave in a fashion such that 
housing needs receive first priority in their investment portfolios. 
Only after these investment needs are satisfied do households 
release their residual savings for "productive" accumulation pur- 
poses, through banks, nonbank financial institutions, and informal 
"curb" markets. This characterization is motivated by McKinnonls 
(1973) emphasis on "financial market fragmentation". Since the 
formal mortgage market is poorly developed or nonexistent in much 
of the Third World, we have assumed that none  of the three private 
housing sectors (rural, urban "squatter settlements", urban 
"luxury housing") are able to secure external finance to satisfy 
investment requiremenzs. Housing investment is therefore self- 
financed by each household sector independent of other surplus- 
generating sectors. While this specification eliminates the 
possibility of intersectoral housing financial flows, it does not 
exclude the possibility of intrasectoral housing financial flows. 
For example, fathers may loan to sons, but "middle-class" skilled 
households cannot loan to poor "unskilled" households. Certain 
sectors may therefore be starved for housing finance while others 
have a surplus which they allocate to the national saving pool 
for "productive" accumulation or training investment. 
Under conditions of rapid population growth, it is quite 
possible that household savings will be fully exhausted by 
housing investment requirements. This potential demographic 
burden is reinforced in our model by rapid rates of urbanization. 
This follows from the fact that housing is location-specific; 
thus, migration of even a stable aggregate population requires new 
housing construction in the receiving regions, and net investment 
economy-wide. Furthermore, given the cost-of-living adjustment 
embedded in the model's migration function, rapid inmigration and 
urbanization may well be forestalled by the urban housing require- 
ments that these population movements imply. An urban housing 
investment shortfall will result in a rise in urban rents thereby 
attenuating inmigration. ' Alternatively, increased urban housing 
investment serves to inhibit the accumulation of "productive" 
capital, and we know that the rate of productive capital accumula- 
tion is a central determinant of the relative expansion of 
employment in the modern sectors. 
This treatment illustrates the importance of general 
equilibrium paradigms in accounting for the sources of growth and 
structural change. Consider the analysis of intersectoral 
migration. The benefits of migration in reallocating labor to 
its highest productivity will be partially offset in our model 
by the costs resulting from the diversion of "productive" 
investment funds to "unproductive" urban housing. The rate of 
urbanization will tend to diminish as a result. A similar impact 
results from rising urban housing rental prices. Thus, rapid 
rates of urbanization will trigger endogenous forces tending to 
suppress *overurbanization", a result which may provide a very 
different characterization of intersectoral labor transfers than 
would be forthcoming from partial equilibrium demographic 
estimates of urban change. Projections of city populations 
exceeding thirty million (U.N., 1976) are likely to merit serious 
qualification in the face of economic adjustments like those 
contained in our model. Only general equilibrium modeling of 
the sort contained in our housing-cum-migration specification can 
capture the various countervailing forces associated with 
urbanization, economic growth, and structural change. 
What remains is to convert these qualitative descriptions of 
investment demand in housing under capital market fragmentation 
into explicit quantifiable equations. At given prices and incomes, 
we specify the following type of urban housing investment demand 
equation: 
= Max (0, IH , ,} 
IH, 1 I 
where si L. P-l is the saving generated by households consuming the 
_ J J  jth type of housing (deflated by P and thus converted into hous- 
N j ing investment quantities), IN,, is n e t  investment in housing, and 
I H , ~  is gros s  investment in housing. The first expression simply 
states that household saving in sector j may be binding on housing 
investment in that sector. If not, dwelling investment will not 
exhaust the sector's household saving and a surplus will be 
available for accumulation in other forms. Our expectation is that 
rural households will consistently have a surplus available for 
accumulation in other forms in spite of a low per capita income. 
This may also hold for the urban skilled and property income 
recipient classes, but is less likely for the urban unskilled 
household sector. The second expression above simply states that 
gross investment cannot be negative. This expression is unlikely 
to be binding under conditions of rapid population growth, even 
with substantial rural outmigration rates. ~epreciation 
requirements are given by 6Htj H .  j 
it In discussing the determinants of net investment, IHtj, 
will be helpful to define the following terms, some of which are 
new while others are added to refresh the reader's memory: 
A 
r = an index of profitability of housing investment 
H, j 
in the jth housing stock, a "benefit-cost" 
ratio computed as the ratio of the discounted 
stream of net rents to current construction 
costs; 
P = per unit construction costs of H j j ' 
r = per unit "structure rent" on H (a shadow price 
H,j j 
since owner-occupied status is assumed, and 
thus rents are fully flexible with no market 
stickiness) ; 
i = the discount rate, or average rate of return 
on physical capital economy-wide; 
'H. j = total rental price, including both the site and 
structure rental components. 
Using these definitions, net investment in housing in the jth 
sector is written as 
A 
where rH is the index of investment profitability: 
, j 
A 
High values of rH indicate high profitability with positive j 
gaps between capitalized anticipated net rents and current 
construction costs.* This expression also states that net 
investment in housing should be zero when the benefit-cost ratio 
is unity, that is, where the economy-wide percentage rate of 
return equals the rate of return on sector j's new housing invest- 
A 
ment. Higher values of rH imply more housing investment at 
I j 
the expense of alternative investment elsewhere in the economy. 
It should be apparent by Figure 8 that net investment in 
housing can take on negative values as the benefit-cost ratio 
falls below unity, but since gross investment is restricted to 
non-negative values, a limit on the size of the negative values 
of net housing investment is implied as 
The previous expression simply postulates that new housing 
investment is responsive to profitability in a nonlinear way as 
in Figure 8. 
The housing investment demand equations for all three 
sectors can now be written formally as 
*We assume naive expectations and infinite life here for 
simplicity. Furthermore, E~ is taken to be common to all types 
of housing investment. 

and 
and 
A s  equa t ions  ( 7 9 ) - ( 8 1 )  r e v e a l ,  s t r u c t u r e  r e n t s  a r e  c e n t r a l  t o  
t h e  de t e rmina t ion  of  2H 
, j Given Cobb-Douglas housing s e r v i c e  
produc t ion  f u n c t i o n s  ( S e c t i o n  2.8), urban s t r u c t u r e  r e n t s  a r e  
Recall that rH is a shadow price since all housing is owner- 
, j 
in the occupied in our model. Note, too, the presence of PH 
, j 
expression for rH 
t 1 It is the total rental price after urban 
residential property taxes have been assessed and paid. (See 
equations (17) and (18) and the discussion in Section 2.8.) 
Since "wasteland" has no value in rural areas and since we 
assume the absence of rural property taxes, rural rents implied 
by the fixed coefficient production function are 
Finally, 
€H is an unknown parameter in (76)-(78), but we shall 
experiment with alternative values. @ 
There are three sectors involved in housing construction 
in our model. IHtRS represents rural dwellings produced by the 
informal RS sector, perhaps even constructed by the occupying 
household itself and with "waste" materials. 
'H, US represents 
similar low-cost urban dwellings ("shanty" housing or "squatter 
settlements") produced by the informal labor-intensive US sector, 
also perhaps even constructed by the occupying household itself. 
IH, KS denotes high-cost housing, produced by the formal con- 
struction sector, which, as part of KS activities, is relatively 
capital and skill intensive, and generates intermediate input 
demands in the primary product and manufacturing sectors. When 
these housing investment requirements are valued by current 
construction costs, P total investment demand for housing is j' 
obtained in value terms: 
HOUSING = pRS I ~ , ~ ~  + 'us IH,US + 'KS IH,KS 
It might be helpful to summarize saving, accumulation, and 
capital goods sector activity at this point. In terms of the 
majoritiy of computable general equilibrium models, ours is unusual 
in its treatment of accumulation. There is not just one mode of 
accumulation, but rather there are three (skills, physical 
capital and housing). There is not just one capital goods 
sector, but rather four (KS producing skills; RS,US, and KS 
constructing dwellings; and M producing physical capital goods). 
Since each of these capital goods producing sectors is 
characterized by quite different factor-intensities, changes in 
the mix of accumulation over time can have important implications 
for the structure of output, price patterns, and the derived 
demands for inputs. This distinguishes our model from the 
tradition that has flowed from Uzawa's classic contributions. 
Uzawa (1961, 1963) found that a sufficient condition for unique- 
ness of the static equilibrium was that the consumption goods 
sector be more capital intensive than the capital goods sector. 
While Gordon (1961) has suggested that this assumption may not 
be unreasonable for higher-income economies, it appears 
artificial when applied to less developed societies. It seems 
to us more appropriate in any case to stress that factor-intensity 
even in the static model is endogenous and conditional upon the 
direction which the economy-wide portfolio mix takes. Shifts 
in favor of skills investment imply skiZZ-intensive capital 
goods activity (increasingly KS-oriented); shifts favoring 
conventional physical capital accumulation imply capital-intensive 
capital goods activity (increasingly M-oriented); shifts favoring 
low-cost housing imply labor-intensive capital goods activity 
(increasingly RS- and US-oriented). These forces havepotentially 
important implications for the distribution of income. 
Note, too, that the three modes of accumulation are 
explicitly competitive. Skills accumulation takes place up to 
the point where rates of return are equated to the economy-wide 
rate on physical capital accumulation. Physical capital goods 
are allocated across the three capital-using sectors so as to 
minimize rate of return differentials. Dwelling investment will 
utilize household saving only up to the point where rates of 
return are equated to the economy-wide rate on physical capital 
accumulation. Of course, there are institutional and technological 
features which seriously restrict the economy's ability to equate 
rates of return at the margin. Any of the three dwelling markets 
(rural, urban "squatter settlements" and formal urban "luxury") 
may be starved for funds since the absence of an intersectoral 
mortgage market may leave housing investment requirements in 
excess demand. The immobility of physical capital stocks between 
sectors makes it possible that current physical investment 
allocations are insufficient to equalize rates of return to 
capital between A, M, and KS. Indeed, the larger are housing 
requirements, the smaller is the residual pool available for 
physical capital accumulation and the more likely that current 
investnent allocations are insufficient to equalize sectoral rates 
of return. Furthermore, firms1 demands for skills may be 
unsatisfied if the stock of "potential trainables" is insufficient 
to meet training investment levels which would equalize rates of 
of return economy-wide. In short, capital market disequilibrium 
may well be a permanent attribute of our economy. 
2.13 Dynamics: Physical Accumulation, Land 
Growth, and Technological Progress 
Current net investment is equal to total gross investment 
minus depreciation, where depreciation is taken to be proportional 
to the capital stock. Thus, aggregate "productive" physical 
capital stocks and "unproductive" housing stocks are given by 
where the depreciation rates are allowed to vary not only 
between productive capital (containing equipment of shorter life) 
and housing (containing structures only), but also between 
housing of different types (luxury housing presumably having the 
longer life) . 
Land is assumed to grow at a fixed exogenous rate. 
As stated above in Section 2.2, factor-augmenting and 
disembodied technical progress are both present in our model. 
The factor-augmenting rates are given exogenously by 
while the disembodied rates (assumed to be zero in rural housing 
and in both informal service sectors) are given by 
While these propositions appear somewhat arbitrary at first 
glance, in reality they are consistent with important "stylized 
facts" regarding the factor-saving bias of technical progress,the 
unbalanced rate of technical progress across sectors, and the 
economy-wide rate of total factor productivity growth. The first 
two of these attributes of technical progress--factor-saving bias 
and unbalanced total factor productivity growth--have become key 
developmental stylized facts and they are central to debate over 
economic growth and distribution in the Third World. As a result, 
they require considerable elaboration. 
The output-raising effect of technical change has come to 
be known in the literature as total factor productivity growth. 
* 
These sectoral rates of total factor productivity growth, Ti(t), 
define the percentage rise in output, given fixed inputs, as 
Total factor productivity growth rates can be written for each 
of our eight sectors as 
and 
where the ai are output elasticities or factor payment shares. j 
In agriculture, the ai have no time subscripts because the 
, j 
production function is Cobb-Douglas and output elasticities are 
constant. Furthermore, land is absent there since by assumption 
land does not enjoy augmentation through technical progress. 
Both modern sectors exhibit variable output shares over time 
because the CES production functions yield such variability as 
long as modern sector inputs grow at different rates. The 
traditional labor-intensive service sectors have the unskilled 
labor augmentation rate multiplied by ai since diminishing 
returns prevails there (e.g., ai < 1). The housing sectors are 
restricted to constant disembodied rates, and the empirical 
evidence may well warrant our setting AH = 0 for aZZ sectors, j 
not just rural housing. 
These expressions make it possible for sectoral rates of 
total factor productivity growth to diverge, a result we shall 
label unbalanced productivity advance. There seems to be general 
agreement in the literature (Kendrick, 1961, 1973; Uneo and 
Kinoshita, 1968; Watanabe, 1968; Massel, 1961; Baumol, 1967) 
that the modern sectors exhibit the most rapid total factor 
productivity growth, with agriculture lagging behind in spite 
of "Green Revolutions" and with traditional services almost 
stagnant. Our model is fully capable of replicating unbalanced 
productivity advance of this sort. However, even better docu- 
mentation is available for the overaZZ rate of total factor 
productivity growth for Third World economies (for recent 
estimates, see Christensen and Cummings, 1974; Elias, 1978; 
Levy, 1978; Colosio, 1979) and this aggregate rate can be 
written as 
where wi(t) represents sectoral value added shares in GNP. It 
should be apparent that this economy-wide rate need not be 
constant over time, even with all the X's in (113)-(120) 
constant. Indeed, economy-wide total factor productivity growth 
has two parts, both of which are endogenous. The first part, 
* 
wi(t) Ti(t), is known in the literature as intratndustry total 
f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth. Given unbalanced t o t a l  f a c t o r  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth, t h o s e  s e c t o r s  wi th  t h e  favored r a t e s  tend 
t o  undergo t h e  most dramat ic  d e c l i n e  i n  supply p r i c e  and the re -  
f o r e  t end  t o  enjoy r e l a t i v e  ou tpu t  expansion. I t  fo l lows  (under 
p r i c e - e l a s t i c  demand c o n d i t i o n s )  t h a t  s e c t o r s  wi th  t h e  h i g h e s t  
* * 
T i ( t )  tend t o  enjoy r i s i n g  w ' s  over  t i m e .  T t ends  t o  rise over  
* 
time a s  a  r e s u l t .  The second ? a r t ,  TRA (t) , i s  known i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  a s  interindustry t o t a l  f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth. 
I n t e r i n d u s t r y  t o t a l  f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth r e s u l t s  from 
improved r e source  a l l o c a t i o n  between s e c t o r s ,  a  source  of growth 
of which much has been made i n  t h e  development l i t e r a t u r e .  
C e n t r a l  t o  t h e  l a b o r  s u r p l u s  model, f o r  example, i s  t h e  premise 
t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  tend  t o  produce a  gap i n  l a b o r ' s  
marg ina l  product  between t r a d i t i o n a l  a g r i c u l t u r e  and modern 
i n d u s t r y  (Lewis, 1954;  F e i  and Ranis,  1961).  Labor mig ra t ion  and 
l a b o r  a b s o r p t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t end  t o  c r e a t e  economy-wide 
p r o d u c t i v i t y  g a i n s  a s  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  u s e s  of h ighe r  
margina l  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Suppose w e  denote  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s h a r e  of 
i n t e r i n d u s t r y  t o t a l  f a c t o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  growth i n  t h e  aggrega te  
r a t e  by t h e  v a r i a b l e  z .  Then 
What do w e  know about  t h e  s i z e  of z? C l e a r l y ,  it i s  a  f u n c t i o n  
of f a c t o r  market d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  s i n c e  t h e  i n i t i a l  s i z e  of t h e  
d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between s e c t o r a l  marginal  p r o d u c t i v i t i e s  i n f l u e n c e s  
t h e  magnitude of t h e  g a i n s  from improved r e source  a l l o c a t i o n .  It  
i s  a l s o  a  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  speed of r e source  r e a l l o c a t i o n ,  and t h e  
l a t t e r  i s  very  much c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  r a t e  of accumulation i n  
both the real world and in our model. In other words, the 
economy-wide total factor productivity growth rate in our model 
is partially embodied. (For a similar argument with a somewhat 
different model, see Kelley and Williamson, 1973.) Edward Denison 
(1967, 1974; Denison and Chung 1976) has offered estimates of z 
for advanced economies in the post World War I1 period, but we 
would expect z to be larger in the Third World where the rate of 
structural change is more dramatic and, presumably, the initial 
factor market disequilibria are greater. Estimates from Asia 
(Ezaki, 1975) and Latin America (Colosio, 1979) suggest that z 
* 
may lie between a third to a half of T(t) . 
Factor-saving can take two forms. First, a shift in the 
output mix may favor one or a group of inputs at the expense of 
others. For example, the expansion of the manufacturing sector 
will tend to increase demands for the two inputs used relatively 
intensively there, capital and skills. In other words, unskilled 
labor is "saved" economy-wide by this shift in output. Such 
"compositional" effects are likely to have important implications 
for income distribution, causing a relative decline in the 
unskilled wage and concommitant inequality trends. To the extent 
that such compositional changes are induced by the character of 
technical change itself, they can be classified unambiguously as 
factor-saving technological progress. Unbalanced rates of total 
factor productivity growth favoring the capital-cum-skill 
intensive sectors, thus inducing a shift in output to those 
sectors enjoying the relatively rapid rates of cost reduction, 
would be exactly the kind of technical progress yielding that 
result. 
The second form of factor-saving technological progress can 
be analyzed conveniently in terms of the Hicksian concept of 
neutra,lity. Technical progress is neutral if it leaves the 
capital-labor ratio unaltered at a constant ratio of factor 
prices. The ~icksian factor-saving bias, Bi(t), is defined to 
be the proportionate rate of change in the marginal rate of 
factor substitution in that sector. In the simple two-factor 
case, 
i 1 
where FK and FL are the marginal products of capital and labor, 
respectively. F'or any given capital-labor ratio in the ith 
sector at time t, technical progress is labor-saving in the 
Hicksian sense if Bi(t) > 0. It can be shown that the bias can 
also be written as 
Thus, the bias depends on the difference between the rates of 
factor augmentation through technical change and on the elastic- 
ity of factor substitution. 
There is accumulating empirical evidence supporting the view 
that technological progress in the modern.anctor is non-neutral. 
Indeed, this has become one of the stylized facts of contemporary 
development in the Third World. (For a review see Morawetz, 1974; 
Cline, 1975; and the following econometric studies: David and 
Van de Klundert, 1965; Williamson, 1971a; Binswanger, 1974; Levy, 
1978.) There is no need to review the explanations of the labor- 
saving bias ill modern sectors in the Third World, but the bias 
has explicit implications for factor augmentation rates through 
technical change in our model. Since elasticities of substitu- 
tion are less than unity in both manufacturing and the modern 
service sector, it follows that labor-saving can be captured by 
the restriction XL > XK. This restriction also implies another 
aspect of technological dualism thought to be relevant in the 
Third World. Namely, while labor-saving is typical of the modern 
sectors, it is not characteristic of traditional activities. The 
model is fully consistent with this asymmetry since, for example, 
the Cobb-Douglas production function in agriculture implies 
B(t) = 0. 
In short, our model appears to capture the two central 
attributes of technical progress thought to be stylized facts in 
the Third World: it can deal effectively with both unbalanced 
as well as labor-saving productivity advance. It also offers 
an endogenous treatment of economy-wide total factor productivity 
advance. 
2.14 Dynamics: Demographic Change and Labor Force Growth 
Advances in demographic techniques and Third World demo- 
graphic data make the elaboration of the model's labor supply 
specification feasible and attractive. Given the initial regional 
distribution of labor consistent with short run equilibrium in the 
economic model, given a percentage age-sex-region distribution 
of the total population in the initial period, and given age-sex- 
region labor force participation rates we can readily determine 
the population distribution by age, sex, and location consistent 
with the labor force distributions in short run equilibrium. 
Given additional information on mortality and fertility rates by 
region, this population stock can then be augmented in the next 
period. Applying the constant age-sex-region specific labor 
participation rates to these new population stocks, the demograp!~ic 
model will yield the necessary labor force stocks to be used by 
the economic model in the new time period. All of this requisite 
demographic information is available for the countries in our 
representative sample. The demographic model and the nocessary 
accounting is given in Schmidt (1979). A summary statement of the 
labor force equations coming from the demqgraphic model appears in 
equations (1 22) - (1 28) below. First, we assume that capitalists 
are a fixed proportion of the total population, N. Thus, 
Second, the new stock of skilled labor is simply the old stock, 
less those lost by mortality and/or retirement, plus the (gross) 
numbers trained last year: 
where m is the "mortality" rate among the skilled. The unskilled 
S 
labor force is therefore 
i = 1, ..., n age classes ,(126) 
j = 1 ,2 sex classes , 
i = 1, ..., n age classes , (128) 
j = 1 ,2 sex classes . 
Two other features of the demographic accounting should be 
noted. First, the demographic model also keeps track of the 
enrollment rates by age-sex-region and thus the educational 
attainment levels in the regional labor stocks as well. These en- 
rollment rates are exogenous to both the econonic and demographic 
models, and are determined by government policy. This manifesta- 
tion of government educational policy is central to the skills 
accumulation process in our economy described in Section 2.7. 
Second, the demographic model requires information on the age-sex 
characteristics of the rural-urban migration flows. 
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APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL STATEMENT OF CEM 
Sector Subscripts 
Subscripts 
(Production) 
KS: 
agriculture 
urban luxury housing; housing stock 
originally constructed in KS sector 
rural housing; housing stock originally 
constructed in RS sector 
urban "slum" housing: housing stock 
originally constructed in US sector 
capital-intensive services (electricity, 
gas, water, transportation and communi- 
cations, defense,,construction of urban 
"luxury" housing stock, education) 
manufacturing (manufacturing and mining) 
rural labor-intensive services (domestics, 
personal services, construction of rural 
housing stock) 
urban labor-intensive services (domestics, 
personal services, construction of "slum" 
housing stock) 
Factor Subscripts (Production) 
K: capital 
L: unskilled labor 
R: land 
S: skilled labor 
Z: imported raw materials, including fuel 
Location Subscripts 
R: rural 
U: urban 
Commodity Subscripts (Demand) 
A: food (A sector) 
C: clothing (M sector) 
D: durables (M sector) 
H: rent (H sectors) 
S: labor-intensive personal services 
(RS or US sector) 
T: transportation and communications (KS 
sector) 
Household Subscript  eman and) 
C: capitalists and landlords 
KS: urban "favored" unskilled employed in 
KS sector 
M: urban "favored" unskilled employed in 
M sector 
R: rural unskilled from A and RS sectors 
S: skilled from M and KS sectors 
US: urban unskilled employed in US sector 
Parameters 
a coefficient for translating housing HIRSW 
stock into "rental units" for rural 
housing 
a ~ ,  j: output elasticity (and cost share) of 
th j- primary input in A sector, j = K,L,R 
"G : intercept in the government saving 
function 
a i, F: output elasticity (and cost share) of 
th 
composite of primary inputs in the i- 
sector, i = M,KS (a value-added share in 
gross output) 
a output elasticity (and cost share) of i,Z' 
. th Z in the 1- sector, i = A,M,KS 
o u t p u t  e l a s t i c i t y  (and c o s t  s h a r e )  of  
t h  t h  j- i n t e r m e d i a t e  i n p u t  i n  t h e  i- 
s e c t o r ,  i f j = A,M,KS 
r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e  pa r ame te r  i n  t h e  
i n f o r m a l  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r s ,  i = US,RS 
o u t p u t  e l a s t i c i t y  (and c o s t  s h a r e )  o f  
hous ing  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  u rban  hous ing  
p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s ,  j = US,KS 
o u t p u t  e l a s t i c i t y  (and c o s t  s h a r e )  of 
u rban  l a n d  i n  u rban  housi'ng p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n ,  j = US,KS 
marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  s a v e  o u t  o f  
government revenue  ( t a x e s  and f o r e i g n  
" a i d "  ) 
t h  
m a r g i n a l  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  consume t h e  i- 
commodity o u t  o f  supernumerary  income, 
t h  by t h e  j- household  t y p e  
marg ina l  c o s t  of  t r a i n i n g  s k i l l e d  
workers  of t h e  k g  ( f o r m a l )  e d u c a t i o n a l  
a t t a i n m e n t  
c o e f f i c i e n t  m e a s w i n g  t h e  impac t  o f  
i n c r e a s e d  u rban  p o p u l a t i o n  on  government 
s a v i n g  
t h  . t h  
s u b s i s t e n c e  bund le ,  i- commodity, 1- 
household  t y p e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  r a t e  on r e s i d e n t i a l  
( hous ing )  s t r u c t u r e s ,  j = US,RS,I<S 
d e p r e c i a t i o n  r a t e  f o r  p h y s i c a l  ( "p roduc-  
t i v e " )  c a p i t a l ,  i = A,M,KS 
e l a s t i c i t y  pa r ame te r  i n  t h e  n e t  hous ing  
i nves tmen t  f u n c t i o n s  
m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  pa r ame te r  i n  t h e  n e t  
hous ing  i nves tmen t  f u n c t i o n ,  
j = US,RS,KS 
f i x e d  "wage-gap" between u n s k i l l e d  
l a b o r  i n  M and KS r e l a t i v e  t o  US 
'if j,k : labor force participation rate, 
i = age, j = sex, k = location 
j : rate of total factor productivity th growth in the j- housing sector 
attributable to neutral, disembodied, 
sector-specific technological change, 
j = US,RS,KS 
rate of total factor productivity 
th growth in the i- sector attributable 
to neutral, disembodied, sector-specific 
technological change, i = M,KS,A 
rate of augmentation of physical capital 
through technological change 
rate of augmentation of unskilled labor 
through technological change 
rate of augmentation of skilled labor 
through technological change 
th distribution parameter in the i- sector 
value-added CES production function 
(*i,~ ) ,  i = M,KS th distribution parameter in the i- 
sector composite capital function (mi), 
i = M,KS 
rate of land growth 
elasticity of substitution between 
"composite capital" (Q) and unskilled 
th labor in the i- sector value-added 
production function (aitF) , i = M,KS 
elasticity of substitution between 
th 
capital and skilled labor in the i- 
sector composite capital function (mi), 
i = M,KS 
sales tax rate on consumption of 
M sector goods 
tax (or subsidy) rate on agricultural 
intermediate inputs purchased from 
manufacturing 
'I II, KS : proportional "corporate" profit tax 
rate in KS "mixed enterprise" sector 
'I II,M~ proportional "corporate" profit tax 
rate in M sector 
urban property tax rate imposed on 
'IH,~. th 
current value according to j- type of 
residential housing, j = US,KS 
'I T,M: (equivalent) ad va lorem tariff rate on 
M goods imports 
T T,X: (equivalent) ad va lorem tax rate on 
A goods exports 
'IY : 
proportional income tax rate on property 
income and skilled earnings 
T: share of urban migrant's income trans- 
ferred to rural households, i = M,US,KS 
QC: share of capitalist and landlords in the 
total population 
Y :  after tax, "corporate" pay-out rate, 
i = M,KS 
Exogenous Variables 
th 
%,j: intercept in the j- housing produc- 
tion function, j = US,KS 
th 
Ai: intercept in the i- sector's produc- 
tion function, i = A,M,US,RS,KS 
C: number of capitalists and landlords 
- 
F: nominal value of "foreign aid" and 
private capital inflow 
L: total unskilled labor stock 
mS : net mortality (and retirement) rate 
of urban skilled workers 
N: population 
j,k : population, i = age, j = sex, 
k = location 
I!: export price of A goods, f .o.b. 
- 
PA: domestic market price received by 
producers of A goods 
- 
Pi: per unit domestic value-added price 
of A goods 
: 
world market price of M goods, c. i. f. 
domestic market price received by 
producers of M goods 
per unit domestic value-added price of 
M goods 
price per unit of imported raw 
materials 
total land stock 
augmentation level of physical capital 
through technical change 
augmentation level of skilled labor 
through technical change 
augmentation level of unskilled labor 
through technical change 
End.ogenous Variables 
c: marginal cost of training per skilled 
worker 
th c - nominal consumption, j- household 
1. 
th COL cost-of-living in the j- household j 
dA: nominal rent per hectare of farmland 
dU: nominal rent per hectare on urban land 
nominal rent per hectare on urban land d ~ ,  j *  th containing j- type structure, 
j = USIKS 
DA: total private consumption demand for 
A goods 
th total rental demand for j- type D~,j. 
housing, j = US,RS,KS 
D~~ : total private consumption demand for 
KS goods 
DM: total private consumption demand for 
M goods 
HOUSING: 
total private consumption demand for 
RS goods 
total private consumption demand for 
US goods 
government current expenditures, net 
of investment in training (education) 
or "productive" capital 
government saving available for training 
or "productive" capital accumulation 
th j- type housing stock, j = US,RS,KS 
total gross investment in housing 
economy-wide discount rate 
th gross housing investment, j- type 
housing, j = US,RS,KS 
th 
net housing investment in j- type 
housing, j = US,RS,KS 
gross sectoral investment, "produc- 
tive" physical capital, i = A,M,KS 
total gross investment, "productive" 
physical capital 
KS outputs purchased for skills 
investment 
physical (productive) capital in the 
. th 
1- sector, i = A,M,KS 
th unskilled labor in the i- sector, 
i = A,M,US,RS,KS 
unskilled labor in rural area 
unskilled labor in urban area 
potential stock of unskilled urban 
th 
"trainables" of the k- (formal) 
educational attainment 
net imports of M goods 
th 
nominal rental cost per unit of j- 
type of housing 
net rent on urban housing units 
received by owner after property tax, 
j = US,KS 
th th price of i- commodity paid by j- 
household 
per unit price of KS output 
per unit value-added,price of KS 
output 
per unit price of RS output 
per unit price of US output 
th 
"composite capital" in the i- sector, 
i = M,KS . 
anticipated gain in profits due to 
investment in skilled workers, j = II,KS 
th 
"rental units" produced by the j- 
type housing stock, j = US,RS,KS 
th 
output of the i- sector, 
i = A,M,KS,US,RS 
th corcposite of primary inputs in the i- 
sector, i = M,KS 
th intermediate input of j- good into the 
. th 
1- sector 
th profitability index on the j- type of 
housing, j = US,RS,KS 
th structure rents on the j- type of 
housing, j = US,RS,KS 
pre-tax returns to efficiency 
th 
capital in i- sector, i = A,M,KS 
quasi-rents per unit of efficiency 
th 
capital in i- sector, i = A,M,KS 
pre-tax returns to physical capital in 
. th 
1- sector, i = A,M,KS 
profitability index on skills investment 
th in the j- industry, j = M,KS 
th 
urban land stock for the j- type 
housing, j = US,KS 
TRAINING COSTS: 
land in farms 
th 
nominal saving, j- household 
total economy-wide savings 
total skilled labor stock 
th 
skilled labor in the i- sector, i = MIKS 
total skilled workers trained 
th 
skilled workers trained in the j- sector 
total government tax revenue 
total costs of training skilled workers 
urban migrants' transfers per rural 
household 
urban migrant's transfer per unskilled 
household, i = US,M,KS 
urban migrant's transfer per skilled 
household, i = MIKS 
value of farm land, per hectare 
value of urban residential property 
per dwelling 
th 
nominal expenditures by j- housholds 
th 
on i- commodity 
efficiency wage, unskilled labor in 
. th 
1- sector 
annual earnings, unskilled labor in 
. th 
1- sector 
th efficiency wage, skilled labor in i- 
sector 
th 
annual earnings, skilled labor in i- 
sector 
expected urban unskilled earnings facing 
potential outmigrant 
net exports of A goods 
th disposable income, j- housholds 
1-3w material (imported) inputs used in 
. th the 1- sector, i = A,M,KS 
PRODUCTION 
a i,F a i,Z a 
- TT i j Q~ - A~ Q ~ , ~  'i Qi, j i = II,KS # j=A,M,Ks 
COMMODITY, SERVICE AND LAND PRICE RELATIONSHIPS 
- 
- 4 4  
Pl.l - PM ( '  + TTrM) 
PRIMARY FACTOR MARKETS 
Labor Markets 
- 
i = M t K S  , and where Pi' = P i  
- 
i = MIKS , an8 where P ' = PI; M 
Labor Migration 
- 4 
W 
AIL 
= w  RS, L 
C a p i t a l  Markets  
- 
i = MIKS ; and where Pi = PI; I 
Inves tment  A l l o c a t i o n  
such  t h a t  
where 
Intermediate Input Markets 
Land Markets 
FOREIGN TRADE SECTOR 
GOVERNEIENT SECTOR 
Government Taxes 
v Q H , U S  H , U S  H , U S  + 'H ,KS 'H,I<S Q H , K S  
Government Spend ing  a n d  S a v i n g  
G, = a G + bG [T + F I  + yG 1 
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND, SAVING AND INCOME 
vi,  j
COL = 1 Pi ,  j j j 
where t h e  commodity i n d e x  i s :  
i = A E f o o d  ( A  sector)  
C z c l o t h i n g  (M sector)  
D z d u r a b l e s  (M sector)  
T z t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  communica t ions  (KS s e c t o r )  
S E l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e  p e r s o n a l  s e r v i c e s  (RS or US sector) 
H z r e n t  ( i m p u t e d  t o  h o u s i n g  sectors) 
and t h e  househo ld  i n d e x  is :  
j = R E r u r a l  ( L  and LRS) h o u s e h o l d s  A 
US z urban  u n s k i l l e d  (LUS) h o u s e h o l d s  
bl E urban f a v o r e d  u n s k i l l e d  (LM) h o u s e h o l d s  
KS z urban  f a v o r e d  u n s k i l l e d  (L ) h o u s e h o l d s  KS 
S E s k i l l e d  (SM and SKS)  h o u s e h o l d s  
C 5 c a p i t a l i s t  and l a n d l o r d  househo lds  
and where househo ld  i n c o n e s  are: 
and where 
* 
= w  + 
Q P ~ , ~ ~  H t U S  
y u s  u s ,  L Lu - T I ( F i J ~ , ~  
* + 
Q 
'H,US H , U S  - TRF YM = w M,L Lu M,L 
and households f ace  the following pr ices :  
f o r  a l l  j 
f o r  a l l  j ,  i = C,D 
fo r  a l l  j 
f o r  j = US,M,KS,S,C 
fo r  j = S,C 
for j = US,M,KS 
PRIVATE CONSUNPTIOIY DEVANb 
INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS 
Housing Investment 
HOUSING = PRS IHtRS + 'US 'H,US + 'KS 'H,KS 
( 8 5 )  
T r a i n i n g  and S k i l l s  Investment 
O < & L  - 
-
U,O' k = 0, E d  z n years 
where L = opt imal  c l a s s  t r a i n e d  s a t i s f y i n g  (98) and ( 9 9 )  w e  can 
Ctef i n e  
TRAINIEIG C O S T S  = 1 ck L U l  + II [S - 1 LUIk]  I k O l . . . l - l  ( 9 4 )  
k k 
T R A I N I N G  C O S T S  = PKS ISIKS 
Aggregate Savings 
- 
P M  IM = S A V I N G S  - H O U S I N G  - T R A I N I N G  C O S T S  (97)  
MARKET C L E A R I N G  
DYNAMIC EQUATIONS 
Accumulat ion of  C a p i t a l  and R e s i d e n t i a l  S t r u c t u r e s  
Land Growth and Techno log i ca l  P r o g r e s s  
Labor Force Growth and S k i l l  Accumulation 
- f i  - I S - m S  ( 1  26 )  L~ - i 1 1  j ' i , j , u  i , j , ~  
i = l , . .  . , n  aqe c l a s s e s  
j = 1 , 2  sex c l a s s e s  
i = I , .  . . , n  age c l a s s e s  
j = 1 ,2  s e x  c l a s s e s  ( 1 2 8 )  
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